Florida Patent Lawyer Blog

Once again the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) reversed a rejection by an overzealous patent examiner who failed to adequately connect the proverbial dots between prior patents in an attempt to disqualify a patent application for approval ( Ex parte Kobayashi). As a Miami-based Patent Lawyer I constantly keep abreast of new holdings handed down by the BPAI in order to deliver up-to-the-minute defenses for my clients' patent applications.

The patent applicant in this month's Kobayashi decision invented a system for recording the progress of video game players as they achieved certain milestones in online (networked) video games. The inventor describes a system of capturing the players' demographic information for use in supplying targeted advertisements to the gamers when they return to playing a saved online game already in progress from a previous session. For instance, a gamer might achieve level five of a certain game, and then decide to pause and save the session information online. The invention would supply targeted advertisements to the gamer upon his or her return to the game - possibly based on the player's physical location, age or sex demographics, etc.

As is often the case, the patent examiner attempted to produce evidence that this invention had already been disclosed in prior patents. Here, the examiner pointed to a prior patent that describes saving the progress of a game on a local hardware storage unit (Yoshida, JP 2000-005439, Jan 11, 2000). Next the examiner produced a second invention that allows a user to actively participate in television game shows and rewards the user by printing out coupons or other "rewards" on a hardware device located in the viewer's home - there is certainly nothing "targeted" mentioned in the description of this invention either (Von Kohorn, US 6,443,840 B2, Sep 3, 2002). In essence, the examiner tried to argue that because one inventor came up with a method of saving the progress of a video game on his computer, and another inventor came up with a method of allowing a television viewer to print out coupons or other untargeted materials at their home, this obviously equated to the applicant's invention described above. This is a classic case of "hindsight reconstruction" in which the examiner attempts to connect very dissimilar references in order to bolster the conclusion that it would have been obvious to anyone practicing in the industry that this would be readily discernable based on the prior patents.

Sometimes patent examiners make ridiculous stretches of the imagination in an attempt to discredit a new invention as having already been anticipated. Just because algae has chlorophyll, and sea kelp has "bulbs" that look like acorns, doesn't mean that it's obvious that a land-based oak tree would have evolved with both characteristics and produced acorns. Of course in hindsight it might be, but hindsight is always 20-20, and this is a classic case where hindsight fails to persuade that something was "obvious".

It's an issue that comes up often. A manufacturer makes a widget and sells it to a U.S. importer, who registers the mark associated with the widget. The manufacturer later claims it owns the mark and seeks to cancel the importer's trademark registration. As a Florida Trademark Lawyer, this is a situation I've seen more than once and I'm constantly looking for the courts' and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's (TTAB's) take on this issue. The TTAB's recent decision on this issue in the ZYTNIA vodka case affirms the widely held stance that it's usually the registrant that wins.

As originally reported in the Property Intangible blog, strike one against the manufacturer was that it brought the cancellation action almost 11 years after the mark was registered, well after incontestablity is established. Incontestability means, of course, that there are limited bases for cancelling a registration, and incorrect ownership isn't one of them. The manufacturer therefore had to rely on fraud as its basis for cancellation, i.e., the manufacturer. The court stated:

"claims that respondent fraudulently obtained the registration by asserting that it was the owner of the mark when, in point of fact, petitioner owned the mark. Because petitioner has alleged and attempted to establish a willful withholding of ownership information by respondent when it prosecuted the underlying application that matured into the involved registration, the ownership question may be addressed, but only in the context of fraud."

(italics in original.) Fraud has to be "proven to the hilt," showing that a statement was false, the falsity was intentional, and that the false statement was material to obtaining or maintaining a registration.

There's more than one lesson to be learned here. First, ownership of the mark is not a premise for cancelling an incontestable mark. Second, fraud on the USPTO is really hard to prove, since the Bose case.

As a Florida Patent Lawyer, I keep up with recent happenings at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to stay abreast on the latest in trademark law. Recently, the difficulties encountered at the USPTO by NYC-based Foursquare, which offers a location-based social networking website, has come to light.

First off, the trademark application for the company's main mark - FOURSQUARE - has been rejected because an improper specimen was submitted (see trademark application number 77956808). Apparently the attorney for Foursquare submitted an advertisement for the web site and not an actual web page where the applied-for services are rendered. This is a rookie mistake. Serious practitioners don't screw up the specimen requirement. The real question is why didn't Foursquare, which is valuated at $50 million and has 3 million unique users, employ a heavy weight trademark attorney to handle its main mark?

Second, the company's trademark application for CHECK IN (see trademark application no. 7956822) has been refused multiple times on the grounds that it's informational and/or descriptive. In the technology world, there is no hotter term than "check in" right now, especially in light of the fact that Facebook is entering into the location space with Places.While it seems likely that they weren't the first to use it, Foursquare made it ubiquitous among the location-based services. Still, it's a rather descriptive term and it was another rookie mistake to submit a 1(a) use-based application. They should have gone the 2(f) acquired distinctiveness route - they'd probably have a trademark registration by now. Instead, they took the 1(a) route and now there's a Letter of Protest on the record, which will only hurt their case moving forward. Who is this attorney, anyway?

Third, the company's trademark application for FOURSQUARE CHECK IN (see trademark application no. 77956817 ) has been refused for the same reasons as above - it's informational and/or descriptive.

The moral of the story here is that trademark prosecution can be complicated and subtle. Companies with highly-valued trademark assets should hire a specialist that knows his way around trademark law to handle their company jewels, such as an attorney that is Board Certified in Intellectual Property Law.

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) has issued another decision highlighting the "heavy burden" in proving fraud on the USPTO during prosecution of a trademark application (Ex Parte Metal Gear). As a Florida Trademark Attorney, I constantly monitor TTAB decisions for golden nuggets that help me prosecute my client's rights at the USPTO. The holding in this case illustrates how a "fraud on the USPTO" claim can and cannot be won.

The Court in In re Bose Corp., 476 F.3d 1331, 91 USPQ2d 1938, 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2009), set out the relevant standard for proving fraud. The TTAB stated in the Metal Gear decision: "To prove its claim of fraud, opposer would need to prove "to the hilt" with "clear and convincing evidence" that applicant knowingly" made a "false, material misrepresentation of fact" regarding the ownership of the relevant mark." In the Bose decision, the Court emphasized that proving falsity was insufficient. Citing earlier precedent, the Court noted, "absent the requisite intent to mislead the PTO, even a material misrepresentation would not qualify as fraud under the Lanham Act warranting cancellation." Id. at 1940, citing King Auto., Inc. v. Speedy Muffler King, Inc., 667 F.2d 1008, 1011 n.4, 212 USPQ 801 (CCPA 1981).

The TTAB went on to state: "Even if applicant's witness is incorrect in his belief that applicant owns the mark, however, opposer has not carried its heavy burden of proving the "subjective intent to deceive," which, the Court in Bose noted, "however difficult it may be to prove, is an indispensable element in the analysis." Id. at 1941, citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366, 88 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Accordingly, since we find that opposer has not proven "to the hilt" with "clear and convincing evidence," the "subjective intent" of applicant "to deceive" the USPTO by falsely claiming ownership in the METAL GEAR mark, the claim of fraud fails."

The lesson here is that prosecuting a "fraud on the USPTO" claim is super difficult. If you can't get the registrant to admit under oath that he intended to deceive the USPTO, and you don't have a smoking gun document, the fraud claim will lose.

Today the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) issued a decision citing the proper use of the commercial success argument (Ex Parte Buttercup Legacy). As a Miami Patent Attorney I constantly stay up to date on new holdings that strengthen my knowledge of the arguments I use to bolster my clients' positions in pursuing a patent. The holding in this case illustrates the proper use of the commercial success argument, wherein an Applicant cites the success of his product in the market in order to support his argument that his invention is patentably distinct.

The BPAI stated that "Appellant's arguments regarding commercial success are not persuasive." Appellant claims were not rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) but rather under 35 U.S.C. §102. "Arguments directed to secondary considerations are not relevant to a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §102. See Cohesive Technologies Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

On this issue, MPEP §1504.03 states: Once a prima facie case of obviousness has been established, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut it, if possible, with objective evidence of nonobviousness. Examples of secondary considerations are commercial success, expert testimony and copying of the design by others.

The moral of the story is that you should save your commercial success arguments for your 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections because they don't work for 35 U.S.C. §102 rejections.

The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) recently handed down an influential decision when it reversed an obviousness-type rejection (Ex Parte McManamy, Appeal 2009-008781) entered by a patent examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). The 103(a) obviousness rejection statute indicates that a patent may not be obtained if it would have been obvious to someone practicing ordinary skill in the "art" at the time of the invention. The wording of the statute clearly leaves room for subjective interpretation, and as a Miami-based Patent Attorney I constantly stay abreast of new holdings that can strengthen my clients' positions in pursuing a patent application. The holding in this case illustrates the importance of attacking a 103(a) rejection from several different angles to show why the patent examiner did not meet the burden of proof in issuing an obviousness rejection.

In Ex Parte McManamy, the appellants (patent applicants) claimed an invention for a composite mattress constructed with a clear polymeric covering specifically designed for use in confinement facilities to help prevent concealment of contraband. The patent application further describes in detail an advanced polymeric material that is flame retardant, anti-microbial, and resistant to fluids and UV light to be used for the covering.
A patent examiner will typically attempt to connect all aspects of an applicant's invention under review with a prior invention or inventions in an attempt to reject the patent application. If this goal can be convincingly achieved, the BPAI will uphold the rejection. Here, the patent examiner attempted to combine the claims of two different existing patents to obviate the McManamy invention.

First, the examiner pointed to a reference (Hicks, GB 772,025, April 10, 1957) where a "demonstration mattress" covered with a "transparent flexible, tear resistant material comprising sheet polyvinyl chloride covering..." was described. However, as the BPAI pointed out, the reference did not disclose actual use of the demonstration mattress as a consumer product for sleeping, citing the reference, "...it would not be wise to use the sheet polyvinyl for the surface of a mattress for normal use..." Second, the examiner cited the Karafa (US 6,351,864 B1, published March 5, 2002) reference, which disclosed mattresses to be used in correctional facilities. However, the BPAI again indicated in its analysis that Karafa never disclosed a clear plastic covering on the mattress, nor did it disclose that the mattress would be useful in preventing the concealment of contraband.

To the layperson it would appear that the Hicks and Karafa references might fully encompass McManamy, however the missing link is not simply the fact that Karafa did not disclose a clear vinyl covering for its correctional facility mattresses, but also that the Hicks demonstration mattress with the clear covering as described was not disclosed for use as bedding. The BPAI looks for a preponderance of evidence to support the supposition that someone skilled in the design of an invention would have anticipated the invention under review. Here, the evidence did not support sufficient links between the cited references to sustain a finding that the mattress described in McManamy was adequately disclosed. As icing on the cake, the BPAI also pointed out that in 1957 Hicks never could have disclosed the advanced polymeric covering described in McManamy because the technology to produce such a polymer did not exist at the time.

Southern District Court Judge K. Michael Moore recently handed down an equitable and somewhat unique decision regarding a timely dispute over the rights to a Spanish-language version of a Coca-Cola theme song that was created for the 2010 World Cup. At issue in the suit, Vergara Hermosilla v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 10-21418, 2010 WL 2232657 (S.D. Fla. June 2, 2010), was whether the South-Florida based artist retained rights to the content of his work product "Wavin' Flag" - originally performed in English by the artist K'naan - in translating and producing the song. As a Miami-based trademark and copyright attorney, I closely follow such decisions in order to provide up-to-the-minute legal counsel for my clients, many of whom are artist and songwriters.

Coca-Cola had engaged Mr. Hermosilla to produce the work for promotional purposes and he agreed to create the song for the meager sum of one dollar. In return he thought he had negotiated that his name would be listed in the credits - a seemingly reasonable demand given his paltry compensation. In an era where artists are routinely robbed of royalties due to the likes of file-sharing operations like Kaaza.com and Limewire.com, the artist simply desired recognition for his efforts. For some bizarre reason, Coke took issue with this request and chose to fight Mr. Hermosilla on the issue.

After the song had been written, mixed and produced by Hermosilla, Universal Music Group presented him with a contract that did not include naming rights for his production. Hermosilla immediately sent a reply to the company revoking both his license to Coca-Cola to use the song and his agreement for compensation in the amount of one dollar.

After negotiations broke down, Hermosilla sought a preliminary injunction against Coke to prevent the dissemination of the song for as long as the company refused to grant him credit as the producer. Coke claimed that Hermosilla was an employee in a "work-for-hire" transaction that precluded him from taking personal recognition as the artist responsible for creating the work. The judge, thankfully, did not agree with the beverage giant's position.

Judge Moore ruled that because Hermosilla never received consideration for his work (the $1.00) he was entitled to revoke the nonexclusive license to use the copyrighted material. The Judge found that the songwriter's lyrics did not qualify as work-for-hire and that he had exclusive copyright ownership of his translation. He further decided that the songwriter was in danger of being irreparably harmed and that Coke would be preliminarily enjoined from selling or otherwise using the Spanish lyrics without providing songwriter credit.

In a balancing of hardships, Coke was forced to comply with the court's ruling requiring it to conspicuously publish acknowledgment of Hermosilla's contributions to the Spanish language version of the song, and the court cited $15,000,000 in potential losses to Coke for promotional costs if the song were to be prevented from being published through various media outlets that it had contracted with. The Judge ordered that Coke be allowed to air the song, and that Hermosilla was to be credited with the production of the song. All in all, this was a seemingly fair outcome given the conflicting considerations, but it is still unclear why Coke tried to deny Hermosilla acknowledgment for having produced the song.

Last week, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) upheld a Patent Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) of a patent application for an invention that was claimed too broadly. As a Miami Patent and Trademark Attorney I follow BPAI decisions on a daily basis, and I constantly seek wisdom from the mistakes of others.

At issue in Ex parte Tosey was a claim to enhance the initiation of a coupling between a wireless digital device and an "interconnected network". The applicant argued that the terms "interconnect network" and "wireless network" are not synonymous as pertains to a prior patent issued to Elliott (US 6,859,135 B1) in 2005. Unfortunately, the applicant failed to clearly make this distinction in the claims.

In the analysis section of the decision, the BPAI indicated comments made by the Patent Examiner, such as, "Appellant (applicant) seems to suggest that Elliott's network is a wireless network and not an interconnected network because it is not a combination of wired and wireless network," and that," the issue of the interconnected network being wireless or wired is not at all claimed." Oops! The BPAI further points out that the applicant's primary claim "merely requires that data is received from an 'interconnected network' which does not preclude a cellular network."

The lesson here is that the BPAI is required to analyze claims in their broadest reasonable interpretation. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and that a BPAI analysis will not read limitations into the claims from the specification, In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Because the primary claim made in Ex parte Tosey failed to recite a distinction between "interconnected network" and "wireless network", the BPAI was compelled to find that there was no such distinction and therefore rejected the claim. It also didn't help that the patent application contained some typographical errors - a general indication of overall sloppiness in preparing the application.

As I have previously discussed in this blog, when prosecuting a patent application in a crowded field of competitors (such as the wireless networking industry) it is absolutely crucial to point out - in the claims - the limitations and distinctions of your invention as compared to those that are already patented. A twisted version of an old adage reads "Ready, Fire, Aim!", which is a very poor strategy for successful patent prosecution.

In an educational opinion today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) reversed a Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, rejection as failing to comply with the enablement requirement on the grounds that the Appellant provided sufficient "evidence" that the Examiner was wrong. As a Florida Patent Attorney that deals with § 112 rejections frequently, this BPAI decision illustrates a plan of attack for Appellants. See the BPAI decision in Ex Parte Schaefer here .

The Appellant, a chemical company, was appealing a 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, enablement rejection wherein the Examiner concluded that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been able to construct the claimed invention, a fullerene molecule, based on the specification. The Appellant responded by submitting a Declaration, or Affidavit, from one of ordinary skill in the art stating that, in fact, one of ordinary skill in the art WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE to construct the fullerene molecule based on the specification.

The BPAI decided: "We will not sustain this rejection because in our view, the Appellants have submitted evidence sufficient to establish that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to make and use the claimed invention. The Second Declaration of Joseph Talnagi is evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would know how to ... Mr. Talnagi lastly states that a person of ordinary skill in the art would conclude that ... We conclude that the second declaration of Mr. Talnagi is sufficient to rebut the Examiner's case of lack of enablement."

The important lesson here is that a Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, enablement rejection can be successfully rebutted using a § 1.132 Affidavit. If you can provide an Affidavit from one of ordinary skill in the art stating that he/she WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE to construct the claimed invention based on the specification, you've got a potential premise for reversal on Appeal.

Affidavits should be a part of every Patent Attorney's toolbox and can be used to fight other types of rejections, such as 35 U.S.C. § 103 obviousness rejections, as discussed in my previous blog post.

Last week, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued the In re Calera Corp decision, which deemed the term GREEN to be merely descriptive of an environmentally friendly product or service. As a Miami Trademark Attorney, I found this decision interesting in light of the increasing number of GREEN trademarks and service marks that I see in use in every day life.

At issue was an applicant's trademark GREEN CEMENT associated with an environmentally friendly brand of cement. The Trademark Office's examining attorney refused to register this mark under the premise that it was merely descriptive of the product sold by the applicant. Among other things, the applicant argued: "there are abundant meanings associated with the adjective 'green' (at least twenty), consumers must necessarily exercise mature thought or follow a multi-stage reasoning process in order to determine what product characteristics the term GREEN CEMENT refers to. For example, it is not clear whether the cement of Applicant's goods is: 1) freshly set and not completely hardened; 2) green in color; 3) newly manufactured or poured; 4) covered in foliage; or 5) environmentally beneficial."

The TTAB disagreed and found: "The term GREEN indicates that the product is environmentally beneficial. There simply can be no dispute today that the term green, ubiquitously used as an adjective with any good or service, will be perceived as an indicator that the good or service is environmentally friendly." Therefore, since the term GREEN was descriptive of the term CEMENT, the TTAB found the mark descriptive and affirmed the refusal by the examining attorney.

When two descriptive terms are combined, the determination of whether the composite mark also has a descriptive significance turns upon the question of whether the combination of terms evokes a new and unique commercial impression. If each component retains its descriptive significance in relation to the goods or services, the combination results in a composite that is itself descriptive. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 71 USPQ2d1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This is exactly what happened in In re Calera Corp.

From a business owner's standpoint, the lesson is that you should stay away from overly descriptive trademarks. As illustrated above, merely descriptive trademarks are not registrable with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office therefore offer reduced, if any, trademark protection.

What constitutes abandoning a trademark, thereby opening the door for someone else to use it? How long can you cease use of a trademark without losing trademark rights? These are common questions I field regularly as a Miami Trademark Attorney. And the answer depends on a few factors.

The landmark case often cited in trademark abandonment disputes is Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Philip Morris Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 14 USPQ2d 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1990), which involved the abandonment of a cigarette brand. We all know that two years of non-use of a mark is prima facie abandonment. The Imperial Tobacco Federal Circuit case stands for the holding that the trademark owner may rebut the presumption of abandonment arising from its non-use by presenting evidence showing that its non-use during that period was excusable, or evidence showing that, during the period of non-use, it maintained an intent to resume use of the mark. So what constitutes intent to resume and what constitutes an excuse?

The court in Imperial Tobacco set a high bar for proving intent to resume use. Even though the party claiming trademark rights took steps each year from 1981-1987 - the period of non-use - towards introduction of the cigarette brand bearing the mark, the court held this was not enough to prove intent to resume use. Specifically, the following activity was found to be inadequate: 1) developing a marketing strategy for the products bearing the mark, 2) seeking registration of the mark for the goods in question, and 3) making efforts to license the mark.

Similarly, in another case the registrant was found not to have the intent to resume use even though he took the following steps during the non-use period: 1) making trips abroad in an effort to establish stores under the mark 2) meeting with real estate agents and 3) visiting possible sites for the stores and examining stores of competitors. Richard v. Linville, 133 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

The only acceptable excuse outlined explicitly in the Imperial Tobacco case was the pending resolution of trademark litigation, see, e.g., La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1274, 181 USPQ 545, 550 (2nd Cir.1974); New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 418, 90 USPQ 151, 153 (1st Cir.1951). But the court in Imperial Tobacco did not agree that pending litigation was the cause of the non-use in that case.

In conclusion, the bar is pretty high when attempting to rebut a presumption of abandonment of a trademark due to non-use. A successful rebuttal requires a substantial factual showing of a concrete and uninterrupted series of actions to get the mark in use in commerce during the entire period of non-use.

Using strong words, today the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) affirmed a Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. §102(e) anticipation rejection of a Tokyo Electron invention, claiming that the Appellant's attorney's arguments alone held no weight. As a Miami Patent Attorney who reads BPAI decisions almost daily, I enjoyed the subtle drama of this decision and also learned something.

At issue in Ex parte Willis , was a claim to a laboratory measuring device that measured spectral data. In response to the Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. §102(e) anticipation rejection, the Appellant's attorney, from the firm of Oblon Spivak, provided one particular argument, among many, about what a claim term meant to one of ordinary skill in the art. The attorney's particular argument did not include any references to the specification, the cited references, or any textbooks or authoritative works. Also, no §1.132 declaration was provided. This is what the BPAI had to say about this particular argument:

The Appellant's argument is not well taken because it is merely unsupported attorney argument, and arguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence. See In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Ouch! to the layperson, this may seem lightly worded - but to an avid reader of BPAI decisions, this is considered a smack down. Now for the educational moment:

When making statements about a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA), it helps to refer to an authority about what is considered known to a POSITA. You can refer to your own specification, the cited references, other patents in the same area from the same time, textbooks, science/engineering treatises, etc. Also, you can use a §1.132 declaration from your inventor or someone else in the field, IF their credentials are impressive enough to be considered a POSITA. Karen Hazzah has a great blog entry about the use of §1.132 declarations. And the best part of using these authorities, is that the Examiner must rebut this evidence. I wrote a blog entry recently about the Examiner's duty to respond to the evidence you've provided. He can't just dismiss it, he must consider it, rebut it with evidence of his own and provide substantive reasoning as to why your evidence does not overcome the rejection.

Today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) reversed an Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) anticipation rejection of a key Macrovision patent application directed to watermarks for videos. As a Miami Patent Attorney who reads BPAI decisions almost daily, I enjoyed the Ex Parte Ryan decision because it showed a rare smack-down of a Patent Examiner (as far as BPAI smack-downs go).

At issue in this case was whether the cited reference, Collier, disclosed a method for inserting watermarks into a video. Collier, however, did not disclose inserting watermarks into a video but rather detecting watermarks in a video.

In a rare show of criticism of a Patent Examiner, the BPAI offered the following admonishment: "the Examiner has not shown and we do not readily find where Collier embeds watermarks ... as claimed. Instead, Collier is primarily concerned with detecting such watermarks and we are left to speculate on how such watermarks were embedded in the first place. But the scolding didn't end there: "it is impermissible to make guesses in an anticipation rejection. The Examiner has left it up to us to speculate." Consequently, the Board reversed the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) anticipation rejection.

I realize this doesn't exactly read like a scathing W. Safire Op-Ed piece, but this is what passes for excitement at the BPAI.

What can we learn from this? When asserting a 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) anticipation rejection, a Patent Examiner must provide you with a concrete explanation of where each limitation of your claim is found, either explicitly or inherently, in the cited reference. He cannot simply provide a blanket conclusory statement that the cited reference discloses the claim limitation, as Examiners are so fond of doing, leaving you to guess at how or where the limitation is disclosed. At the Examiner Interview, insist that the Patent Examiner point to exactly where you can find the claimed limitation in the cited reference. If he cannot, or doesn't put it on paper, then you have a good premise for reversal on Appeal.

In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102, "[a] single prior art reference that discloses, either expressly or inherently, each limitation of a claim invalidates that claim by anticipation." Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005), citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

Earlier this month, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed a likelihood of confusion refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) in the case of In re Plastic-Plus Awards . See the TTAB decision here. As a Miami Trademark Attorney with a sizable trademark prosecution docket, this case is interesting because it illustrates the law surrounding the comparison of marks in a likelihood of confusion comparison.

At issue was an existing trademark registration for MOTION TROPHY and Appellant's trademark application for MOTION XTREME. The Appellant appealed a likelihood of confusion refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d). In regard to the comparison of the marks, the TTAB started off with a recitation of case law: "In determining the similarity or dissimilarity of marks, we must consider the marks in their entireties in terms of sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression. See Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The test is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impressions that confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks is likely to result."

But then the TTAB hedged a bit when it stated: "Although likelihood of confusion must be determined by analyzing the marks in their entireties, 'there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.' In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985)."

This illustrates that the legal criteria for comparing two marks in a likelihood of confusion inquiry is more complicated that just looking at two marks "in their entirety" and deciding if they are similar. Various other factors are considered during the determination. In this case, the dominance of certain parts of each mark was considered, and weights were placed on certain elements of each mark to reflect that dominance. The final determination, however, was a consideration of the marks in their entireties. Thus, the resulting likelihood of confusion inquiry in this case turned out to be a hybrid of considering the marks in their entirety AND comparing individual elements of each mark. This is one of the subtleties of federal trademark law and one of the main reasons you should consider hiring a Board Certified Specialist in the area of Intellectual Property Law to service your trademark law needs.

In an educational opinion today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) reversed a Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. §103 obviousness rejection on the grounds that the Examiner did not provide "evidence" of the obviousness of the combination of references. As a Florida Patent Attorney that deals with 103 obviousness rejections on an almost-daily basis, I found this decision of the BPAI illustrates a plan of attack for Appellants. See the decision in Ex Parte General Components Inc. HERE.

The Appellant, an electrical component manufacturer, was appealing a 35 U.S.C. §103 obviousness rejection where the Examiner combined two references and followed it up with the standard boiler-plate language we're accustomed to seeing as patent practitioners - it would have been obvious to have modified the first reference to produce the claimed feature.

The BPAI decided (I'll paraphrase here for simplification): "The Examiner did not provide sufficient evidence to support the determination that it would have been obvious to have modified [the first reference to reflect the claimed feature]." The BPAI continued: "There is no evidence that [modifying the first reference] would [produce the claimed feature] ... The substitution of one element for another is generally considered obvious when there is a reason to make the substitution and when the resulting combination yields a predictable result. See KSR, 550 U.S. 398 at 416, 418. In this case, the Examiner determined it would have been obvious to have substituted [a feature of the second reference for a feature of the first reference] but did not explain how [to do it]. Furthermore, the Examiner did not provide sufficient evidence that [the feature of the second reference], when substituted for [the feature of the first reference], would produce [a requirement of the first reference]. The rejection is therefore reversed."

The important lesson here is that a Patent Examiner must provide some evidence that it would have been obvious to modify a first reference to reflect a claimed feature. A standard, conclusory statement by the Examiner doesn't suffice. Ideally, he would provide literature from other patents, academic papers or from textbooks of the time that support his argument. But that is something I rarely see in 35 U.S.C. §103 obviousness rejections from the USPTO. In short, if an Examiner doesn't provide any evidence as to WHY it would have been obvious to modify a reference, you've got a premise for reversal on Appeal.

The other lesson is that a modification of a reference is NOT obvious if, after the modification, the reference is not able to perform its stated purpose. If the modification destroys or frustrates the purpose of the first reference, then the combination is not proper. This "frustration of purpose" argument is one I've made many times before the BPAI, and it provides yet another premise for seeking a reversal on Appeal.