Florida Patent Lawyer Blog

The case of Ex Parte Lin involved a photolithography invention. The Examiner rejected the claims under the 1st paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 for failing to comply with the enablement requirement. According to the Examiner, the Specification disclosure would not enable a person with ordinary skill in this art (POSITA) to make or use, without undue experimentation, a "photomask with wavelength-reducing material throughout the full scope of the claimed refractive index range."

Appellants argued that an artisan could make or use the photomasks because a paragraph of their specification disclosed specific wavelength-reducing materials which are known in the art to have a refractive index larger than 1.

The Board rejected this argumment, stating:

The deficiency of this argument is that it fails to address with any reasonable specificity the issue raised by the Examiner's rejection. Contrary to Appellants' belief, the issue under consideration is not whether specific wavelength-reducing materials disclosed in the Specification have a refractive index larger than 1. ... Rather, the issue before us is whether the Specification would enable an artisan to make and use, without undue experimentation, a photomask with wavelength-reducing materials throughout the claimed refractive index ... See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (the specification must teach those of skill in the art how to make and how to use the invention as broadly as it is claimed). Appellants' argument does not address this issue and therefore does not reveal any reversible error in the § 112, 1st paragraph, rejection.

Not to beat a dead horse, since much has been written about the uselessness of this argument by my fellow patent prosecution bloggers (see Karen H.'s blog posting about this subject here), but seriously, don't use this argument anymore. I have yet to see it succeed even once.

The Ex Parte Michelle case involved a telecommunications network claim rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) for being obvious. The Appellant tried his hand at the "non-analogous art" defense. The Board summarily dismissed this argument in one sentence:

"Further, we find that the references Xu, Huitema and Sollee are in the same field of endeavor, involving middleboxes across multiple address realms on a network. They are thus properly combinable."

That's all the Board wrote. They didn't even offer to explain.

The law on non-analogous art is rather straightforward. References within the statutory terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103 qualify as prior art for an obviousness determination only when analogous to the claimed invention. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA 1979) and In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

The moral of the story here is that the non-analogous art argument is pretty much dead and should be removed from every patent practitioner's toolbox.

The Ex Parte Peng case involved a method claim performed by a GPS receiver. The claim element at issue involved the storage of certain data in sample RAM, followed by a reallocation of purpose of certain memory spaces. The Examiner issued an obviousness type rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a), asserting that the claim element at issue as found in the cited prior art. The Appellant appealed and argued that the claim element was in fact NOT disclosed by the cited prior art.

In a short, one and a half page analysis section, the Board agreed with the Appellant and reversed the rejection. Namely, the Board stated:

"We agree with Appellants that the results of the accumulators are stored in the RAM latch, and not the sample RAM, ... we do not find any teaching or suggestion in the cited reference of a re-allocation for purposes ... there is no indication that some of these time slots ... have been re-allocated in a second mode ... To somehow conclude that the cited re-allocation of the time slots could be accomplished in the RAM latch disclosed in Baranyai would require us to stretch the reference beyond reasonable limits."

It seems like a simple argument - "the prior art does not disclose the claim element" - and it lacks the complexity and depth of standard non-obviousness arguments such as "no articulated reasoning" and "no motivation to combine." But it so happens that this simple argument is the single most successful way to reverse a 35 U.S.C. 103(a) rejection (in electrical cases) on appeal before the BPAI. According to data provided by Michael Messinger, Esq. at the 2010 Board of Patent Appeals conference, 57% of the obviousness reversals in electrical cases were reversed using this argument. The next most successful argument was the "rationale/underpinning", which accounted for 37% of the obviousness reversals in electrical cases.

The lesson here is that if you want to increase your chances of reversing a 35 U.S.C. 103(a) rejection (in electrical cases) on appeal before the BPAI, you would be wise to use "the prior art does not disclose the claim element" argument. This argument is favored by the BPAI, according to the statistics.

The Ex Parte Zurcher case involved an electrical-type socket invention. The claim element at issue included functional language. The Examiner asserted a prior art reference that included structure that performed the same function as described in Appellant's functional language. I.e., the Examiner found the claimed functional language inherent in the prior art reference. The ensuing arguments can be separated in three types:

Argument #1

First, the Appellant argued that the structure of the prior art was not the same as the structure disclosed by Appellant in the specification. Nice try, but even a 1st year knows that's a losing argument. You should only be arguing about what's in the claims, not the specification. The Board disagreed with the Appellant and found:

"The fact that the structure of the prior art is structurally different from the structure of the 'disclosed embodiment' Appellant described in the Specification and depicts in the Figures is of little moment. The name of the game is the claim. In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed.Cir.1998)."

Argument #2

Second, the Appellant argued that one of ordinary skill in the art must recognize that the prior art's structure would be capable of performing the functional language of Appellant's claim. The Board disagreed once more and stated:

"There is no such requirement. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Continental Can does not stand for the proposition that an inherent feature of a prior art reference must be perceived as such by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the critical date."); In re Imeprazole Patent Litig., v. Andrx Pharms, Inc., 483 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (recognition in the prior art is not necessary when the claimed characteristic or function is inherently present in the prior art)."

Argument #3

Lastly, the Board identified the central issue as one of simply determining whether the prior art structure performed the same function as the functional claim language. Period. The Board decided :

"[a] patent applicant is free to recite features of an apparatus either structurally or functionally." In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997). "Yet, choosing to define an element functionally, i.e., but what it does, carries with it a risk." Id. "Where the Patent Office has reason to believe that a functional limitation asserted to be critical for establishing novelty in the claimed subject matter may, in fact, be an inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority to require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on. Id., (quoting In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971) and further citing In re Hallman, 655 F.2d 212, 215 (CCPA 1981); In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 663-64 (CCPA 1971).)"

The Lesson

If you use functional language in your claim, the Examiner must only find structure in a prior art reference that performs the same function. The Examiner is NOT required to find the same structure you disclose in your specification and the Examiner is NOT required to prove that a POSITA would know the prior art structure can perform the function at issue. Additionally, the Examiner does NOT have to show that the intended use of the prior art structure is the same as that of the Appellant. Again, the Examiner must only show the prior art structure can perform the functional claim language.

In conclusion, beware of functional claim language, especially when claiming an apparatus. It is more desirable to use structural claim language, which would require an Examiner to find the same structure in the prior art - often a more difficult task.

The Ex Parte Chin case involved a safety syringe having a retractable needle. The disputed claim element recited a shoulder (of the needle) that was smaller than the hole in the cylinder (so the shoulder could be pulled into the hole). But the prior art of record, Crawford, showed a drawing of a shoulder that was larger than the hole.

First, the Examiner explained away the incongruency by pointing out that the Crawford drawings were not to scale - concluding that we shouldn't give much weight to the Crawford drawings. The Board disagreed and said: "While Crawford does not describe that the drawings are to scale, that does not mean 'that things patent drawings show clearly are to be disregarded.' In re Mraz, 455 F.2d 1069, 1072 (CCPA 1972).

Next, the Examiner asserted that although the Crawford drawings did not point out the exact recited claim element, having a shoulder that was smaller than the hole in the cylinder was inherent. Again, the Board disagreed and stated: "[Crawford's] Figure 6 shows the relative sizes of the shoulder and aperture, and as the Examiner has not directed us to any disclosure in Crawford that supports the position the aperture is sized larger than the shoulder, we find that inherency has not been established. In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Inherency ... may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.")

What does this for the patent practitioner? Inherency is a factual determination and a Patent Examiner must come up with a good reason for this determination. Ideally, the Examiner would provide supporting evidence, such as textbooks, academic articles, etc., as well as convincing articluated resoing for this finding. If the Examiner only provides some weak "Examiner arguments," and has little or any evidence to make his case for inherency, then you have a good premise for reversing this finding at the Board of Patent Appeals.

Ex parte Lockemeyer involved a product-by-process claim of a chemical composition made using a new process. The Examiner issued a 35 U.S.C. 103 obviousness rejection of the product-by-process claim based on a prior art reference that disclosed the chemical composition, but did NOT disclose the Applicant's process. This begs the question - can you properly reject a product-by process claim using a prior art reference that discloses the product but NOT the process? Apparently, you can.

It is well settled that the patentability of a claim in product-by-process form is determined based on the product itself, not on the method of making it. See In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("If the product in a product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior art product was made by a different process."). In light of this precedent, the Board affirmed the rejection of the Applicant's product-by-process claim.

As a side note, it should be noted that the Applicant did argue that Applicant's composition possessed characteristics not held by the composition of the prior art reference. Other than attorney argument, the Applicant offered no other evidence. This argument was, of course, shot down by the Board. When Appellants' product and a product of the prior art appear to be identical or substantially identical, the burden shifts to Appellants to provide evidence that the prior art product does not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of Appellants' claimed product. See Thorpe, 777 F.2d at 698; In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 70 (CCPA 1980); In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 (CCPA 1977); In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 745 (CCPA 1974).

The affirmation of the rejection of the product-by-process claim illustrates the uselessness of these types of claims. The "process" portion of a product-by-process claim clearly has little or no limiting value and is virtually ignored as a claim limitation. Consequently, there is no good reason to add a "process" to a "product" claim. For expediency, product-by-process claims should be avoided and standard chemical composition claims should be used.

The law on this issue states: "It is well settled that the recitation of a new intended use for an old product does not make a claim to that old product patentable." In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Although "[a] patent applicant is free to recite features of an apparatus either structurally or functionally . . . choosing to define an element functionally, i.e., by what it does, carries with it a risk." Id. at 1478. Therefore, since the prior art reference had the identical structure as Appellant's claim, the BPAI decided the fact that it didn't disclose a "deflecting debris" function was irrelevant.

In the Smuckers v. Mack-Ray case, the patent owner had sued the defendant for patent infringement in District Court. Naturally, the patent infringement complaint stated that the defendant's accused device infringed on Mack-Ray's patent. But it so happens that the accused device was described in a prior art reference that predated the filing date of the patent-at-issue. Consequently, in the re-exam proceeding, the defendant Smuckers argued that the patent infringement complaint served as an "admission" by Mack-Ray that its patent was disclosed by prior art - ergo, the patent was anticipated and thus should be invalidated. Novel argument by Jones Day, if you ask me.

The BPAI, however, did not agree. The BPAI stated: "We disagree with the Appellant. We are not directed by the Appellant to any persuasive precedent that mere filing of a lawsuit is an "admission," as asserted. As explained by the Appellant during the Oral Hearing, the Patent Owner instituted the infringement action by filing a simple notice pleading which merely stated that the Patent Owner "owns this patent and Smucker's [Appellant] nozzles infringe." We decline to find such filings to be an admission as characterized by the Appellant.

"While the Patent Owner may have necessarily construed the asserted claims of the '994 patent in concluding that a particular commercialized dispenser infringes, claim construction is a matter of law. The fact that the Patent Owner may have construed the claims one way does not establish what the claims actually mean or that the advocated construction is correct as a matter of law. In this regard, we also disagree with the Appellant's fundamental contention that whatever the implicit claim construction by the Patent Owner is, such construction must be encompassed by the broadest reasonable interpretation used by the PTO. Not only are we not provided with any persuasive authority on point in support of this contention, but the Board's experience in routinely finding unreasonable claim constructions, whether that of appellants or examiners, does not support the Appellant's contention." Ouch!

The moral of the story here is that when it comes to a re-exam, focus on the prior art at hand and how it does or does not anticipate or obviate the patent-at-issue. Don't bring up ancillary or uber-creative arguments that have little or no chance of success and that may evoke a harsh rebuke from the Board. It makes you look bad and that can have an effect on your professional reputation.

The BPAI decided: "We recognize that in giving the term "embedded" the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the usage of the term in the Specification; we have expanded the meaning of "embedded" beyond its common dictionary meaning. However, in this instance, it is clear from the disclosure in the Specification that the meaning of "embedded" is not limited to the dictionary definition. See, e.g., In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)."

In Ex parte Allen Berger, the Applicant recited "one pane" in his claim and the Examiner found a prior art reference with "two panes." The BPAI noted, however, that Applicant didn't define "one pane" in the specification, and it was reasonable to interpret "one pane" to mean "two panes" that have been integrated. The Applicant didn't provide any good reasons why the aforementioned interpretation was unreasonable. The court must construe pending claims as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989). As a result, the BPAI affirmed the Examiner's decision.