Recently in Intellectual Property Litigation Category

Microsoft Sues Robocast for Infringement of Software Patent

February 26, 2013

On Monday of this week, Microsoft filed a patent infringement suit against Robocast alleging infringement of the 6,632,248 patent, which covers customization of network documents. Robocast, a New York based company, enables users to see more web pages, more easily and turns the act of browsing into an automated, interactive experience.
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The 6,632,248 patent covers the customization of network documents by accessing customization information on a server computer using unique user. User-selected customization information for a network (e.g., HTML) document is stored at a server with reference to user identifying information that uniquely identifies the user. Whenever the user navigates back to the network address of the HTML document, the user is identified automatically and receives a customized HTML document formed in accordance with the customization information. This invention allows HTML sites to customize their site to a user's preferences based on previous visits to a website. Not a bad idea in today's multi-platform world where web site viewing problems are common.

The value of the 6,632,248 patent is proportional to the e-commerce industry. According to research firm IDC, the size of total worldwide e-commerce, when global business-to-business and consumer transactions are added together, will equate to $16 trillion in 2013. IDate, another research firm, estimates the global market for digital products and services at $4.4 trillion in 2013. A report by Oxford Economics adds those two together to estimate the total size of the digital economy at $20.4 trillion, equivalent to roughly 13.8% of global sales.

What is the motivation for this lawsuit? Microsoft, the 800 pound gorilla, is obviously protecting its patent and its share of the worldwide e-commerce industry, which it routinely does by keeping a close eye on firms of any size that may pose a threat to their market share. Robocast, which has a single U.S. Patent No. 7,155,451 and other patents pending, may be validated by this lawsuit as it may indicate Robocast is on to something big enough - customization of internet searches - to attract Microsoft's attention. Thus, this lawsuit could affect Robocast's value both negatively, as well as positively,

In Microsoft's favor is the statistic that most patent cases (75.5%, to be exact) settle. When cases do go to final judgment, and almost 15% do, patentees win 989 out of 3,043, or 32.5%, of those cases. Thus, when you look at the general statistics, there is a good chance that Microsoft can either settle this case, or obtain a final judgment in its favor. Of course, these statistics can also be viewed as weighing in Robocast's favor, since it would be to their benefit, as Defendants, to settle this case and continue operating its business.

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The High Tech Patent Wars Continue...

April 10, 2012

The high tech world is continuing its 20-way patent infringement war, but it's not the usual suspects - it's Yahoo vs. Facebook. Yahoo's lawsuit claims that Facebook is infringing on Yahoo's social networking patent (US7599935), which may be the basis of Facebook's networking platform. As of late, the superstar high tech companies have been aggressively taking it to their competitors to protect their current revenue streams, but also, more importantly, to secure a dominant position in the future.
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Yahoo, which has been struggling over the last three years, recently lost ground to Facebook in the online advertising market. There is no doubt that the battle for online advertising is intense and there may not be enough room for all of the current players. Online advertising is extending into the smartphone phone industry, which is one of the motivators behind the 20-way mobile patent war including Microsoft, Apple, Google and Motorola. Control over the internet, cell phones and television (set top-box wars coming soon) is the ultimate goal. Yahoo, which holds about 1,100 patents, is suing Facebook, which holds about 56 patents, over ten Yahoo patents on the eve of Facebook's IPO. Recall that about ten years ago, Yahoo sued Google just before its IPO and settled for Google stock, which was eventually cashed in for $200M.

Is Yahoo being smart about enforcing its patents at this point in time or are they just playing dirty in order to squeeze money from Facebook before its IPO? Why did Yahoo wait until now? If their social networking technology is so good, then why didn't Yahoo get into the social networking business? Maybe the founder of Yahoo and the last Yahoo CEO missed the social networking boat and now the new CEO is playing catch up. Perhaps Yahoo was looking for a nice pay day if they get a similar result as the one they did with Google (though it may take a couple of years). In any case, one can see that there are a myriad of factors and parties that must be considered when enforcing patent rights - not the least of which are the financial or monetary considerations.

Continue reading "The High Tech Patent Wars Continue..." »

The Famous Pfizer Viagra Patent

November 2, 2011

Much has been written about the Pfizer Viagra patent. Recently, a District Court held the patent to be valid. All the fighting about this patent is directly related to Pfizer's $1 billion a year in U.S. Viagra sales. The patent itself has been valuated somewhere in the neighborhood of $10 billion.
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But have you taken a look at the famous Pfizer Viagra patent? I did, and following are some interesting observations. Click here to see Pfizer's Viagra patent.

First, I am surprised to see how short the detailed description is. At less than six columns, it's one of the shorter patents out there. This goes to show, being brief is a virtue - even when you're dealing with a $10 billion patent. Second, notice how many pages of cited references there are. At 6 pages, that's a lot of references, and no doubt led to a stronger and more valuable patent. Lastly, note there are only two inventors. Though the testing and development of this drug probably cost somewhere in the billions of dollars and involved hundreds or thousands of people, it was only two guys that invented this drug and only two guys that will go down in history.

As inventors and developers of technology, we can only hope to have successful inventions. But it is certain that in order to realize a return on R&D investment, individuals and companies must pursue patents for their inventions. Thus, my recommendation to inventors and technology companies is to seriously consider pursuing patents for their inventions with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, especially in cases involving inventions that may generate significant revenue.

Continue reading "The Famous Pfizer Viagra Patent" »

The Most Effective Way of Reversing a 103 Obviousness Type Rejection

April 12, 2011

Yesterday's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision in Ex Parte Peng highlighted the most effective way of reversing a Patent Examiner's 103 obviousness type rejection - contesting the presence of one of the claim elements in the cited prior art. I, a Patent Lawyer practicing in the City of Miami, am always interested in reading about how other attorneys have gotten rejections reversed at the BPAI.

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The Ex Parte Peng case involved a method claim performed by a GPS receiver. The claim element at issue involved the storage of certain data in sample RAM, followed by a reallocation of purpose of certain memory spaces. The Examiner issued an obviousness type rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a), asserting that the claim element at issue as found in the cited prior art. The Appellant appealed and argued that the claim element was in fact NOT disclosed by the cited prior art.

In a short, one and a half page analysis section, the Board agreed with the Appellant and reversed the rejection. Namely, the Board stated:

"We agree with Appellants that the results of the accumulators are stored in the RAM latch, and not the sample RAM, ... we do not find any teaching or suggestion in the cited reference of a re-allocation for purposes ... there is no indication that some of these time slots ... have been re-allocated in a second mode ... To somehow conclude that the cited re-allocation of the time slots could be accomplished in the RAM latch disclosed in Baranyai would require us to stretch the reference beyond reasonable limits."

It seems like a simple argument - "the prior art does not disclose the claim element" - and it lacks the complexity and depth of standard non-obviousness arguments such as "no articulated reasoning" and "no motivation to combine." But it so happens that this simple argument is the single most successful way to reverse a 35 U.S.C. 103(a) rejection (in electrical cases) on appeal before the BPAI. According to data provided by Michael Messinger, Esq. at the 2010 Board of Patent Appeals conference, 57% of the obviousness reversals in electrical cases were reversed using this argument. The next most successful argument was the "rationale/underpinning", which accounted for 37% of the obviousness reversals in electrical cases.

The lesson here is that if you want to increase your chances of reversing a 35 U.S.C. 103(a) rejection (in electrical cases) on appeal before the BPAI, you would be wise to use "the prior art does not disclose the claim element" argument. This argument is favored by the BPAI, according to the statistics.

How to Reverse an Examiner's "Inherency" Conclusion at the Board of Patent Appeals

April 6, 2011

Yesterday's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision in Ex Parte Chin reversed a Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. 102 anticipation rejection, thereby rejecting the Examiner's inherency argument. As a working Patent Lawyer in Miami Florida, I like reading BPAI decisions that show me how to reverse a Patent Examiner's rejection.

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The Ex Parte Chin case involved a safety syringe having a retractable needle. The disputed claim element recited a shoulder (of the needle) that was smaller than the hole in the cylinder (so the shoulder could be pulled into the hole). But the prior art of record, Crawford, showed a drawing of a shoulder that was larger than the hole.

First, the Examiner explained away the incongruency by pointing out that the Crawford drawings were not to scale - concluding that we shouldn't give much weight to the Crawford drawings. The Board disagreed and said: "While Crawford does not describe that the drawings are to scale, that does not mean 'that things patent drawings show clearly are to be disregarded.' In re Mraz, 455 F.2d 1069, 1072 (CCPA 1972).

Next, the Examiner asserted that although the Crawford drawings did not point out the exact recited claim element, having a shoulder that was smaller than the hole in the cylinder was inherent. Again, the Board disagreed and stated: "[Crawford's] Figure 6 shows the relative sizes of the shoulder and aperture, and as the Examiner has not directed us to any disclosure in Crawford that supports the position the aperture is sized larger than the shoulder, we find that inherency has not been established. In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Inherency ... may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.")

What does this for the patent practitioner? Inherency is a factual determination and a Patent Examiner must come up with a good reason for this determination. Ideally, the Examiner would provide supporting evidence, such as textbooks, academic articles, etc., as well as convincing articluated resoing for this finding. If the Examiner only provides some weak "Examiner arguments," and has little or any evidence to make his case for inherency, then you have a good premise for reversing this finding at the Board of Patent Appeals.


Another Losing Non-Obviousness Argument at the Board of Patent Appeals

April 6, 2011

Last week's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision in Ex Parte Roher affirmed a Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. 103 obviousness rejection, thereby rejecting the Appellant's commonly used non-obvious argument. As a Patent Lawyer in Miami Florida, the Ex parte Roher decision was educational in that it highlighted a common losing non-obviousness argument.

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The case of Ex Parte Roher involved packaging for hair color products. The disputed claim limitation included a recitation about alternative hair colors shown on the packaging. The Examiner asserted this claim limitation was obvious in light of the cited prior art, which was also directed to packaging for hair color products. The Appellant asserted the prior did not disclose this claim limitation and further the prior art did not hint or suggest this claim limitation.

The Board rejected the Appellant's argument, and recited the well-known "ordinary creativity" argument with regard to the person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA). Specifically, the Board stated: "Appellants' argument that [the prior art] ... does not disclose warmer, cooler and natural color fails to account for what the art would have suggested to and the creativity of one of ordinary skill in the art. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 US 398, 421 (2007) ("A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton."). Clearly demonstrating variations in tone of a color or even providing different hair color blends for the consumer to view is a desirable feature as taught by [the prior art]."

This decision teaches us that a proper 35 U.S.C. 103 obviousness rejection need not disclose the exact or identical claim limitation at issue. The prior art of record may recite an element that is close to the claim limitation, as long as it would be obvious to a POSITA, who is assumed to have ordinary creativity, to make the leap to the claim limitation. This poses an additional obstacle the patent practitioner must overcome when fighting an obviousness rejection - not only must he support his argument that the prior art of record does not disclose the claim limitation at issue, he must also support his argument as to why it would NOT be obvious to a POSITA to make the logical leap to the claim limitation.

Non-Obviousness Arguments That Don't Work at the Board of Patent Appeals

April 5, 2011

Last week's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision of Ex Parte Lim , which affirmed a Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. 103 obviousness rejection, teaches an important lesson - obviousness rejections must address both references - not just one. As a Miami Patent Attorney that reads BPAI decisions frequently, I'm surprised that any practitioners even try this argument anymore.

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The case of Ex Parte Lim involved a mobile communications network, such as those used by cell phone providers. The Examiner issued a 35 U.S.C. 103 obviousness rejection based on two references - Lipsanen and Siren. The Appellant argued that Lipsanen did not disclose the claimed subject matter. The Appellant did not address Siren and did not address the combination of the two references.

The Board decided: "Appellants' argument [regarding] Lipsanen ... is unpersuasive as it attacks the disclosure of Lipsanen individually, rather than addressing the combination with Sirén described by the Examiner. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) and In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

The lesson here is a simple one. When attacking a 35 U.S.C. 103 obviousness rejection, it doesn't help to attack references individually. You must focus on the central concept behind the Examiner's rejection - the combination of the references. This means you must focus on why the combination - not the individual references - fail to disclose the claimed invention. For example, if your argument involves a claim element that is missing from the prior art, then you must argue that the combination - not the individual references - fail to disclose the claim element.

What is the Burden of Proof when practicing before the Board of Patent Appeals?

April 4, 2011

In short, the answer is "by a preponderance of the evidence." The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision of Ex parte Hochsmann did a good job of highlighting this axiom. As a Miami Patent Lawyer, I found the Ex parte Hochsmann decision interesting because it reminded me of the burden I must carry when I practice before the BPAI.

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The case of Ex parte Hochsmann involved a chemical process including salt crystals. The principal issue in this appeal was whether Appellant had established that the Examiner erred in finding that the prior art reference would have disclosed a salt crystal. But how far must the Appellant go in showing that the Examiner erred?

The Board found: "We are of the opinion Appellant's arguments do not establish that the evidence in the totality of the record weighs in favor of the nonobviousness
of the claimed procedure." The Board went on: " Accordingly, based on our consideration of the totality of the record before us, we have weighed the evidence of obviousness found in the combined teachings of [the prior art] with Appellant's countervailing evidence of and argument for nonobviousness and conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence
and weight of argument, that the claimed
invention ... would have been obvious as a matter of law under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)."

That pretty much says it: your burden of proof before the Board of Patent Appeals is a "preponderance of the evidence." What does that mean?

Preponderance of the evidence, which is one of the lower burdens to meet, is also known as balance of probabilities is the standard required in most civil cases. The standard is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true. Effectively, the standard is satisfied if there is greater than 50 percent chance that the proposition is true. It can be described simply as "more probable than not."

What does this mean to practitioners? This means that in order to reverse an Examiner's decision at the BPAI, you must present slightly more evidence than the Examiner. Technically, that should suffice. Of course, in practice, you probably want to show a bit more, to make it clear you have met your burden

Update on the Aftermath of In re Bose and Fraud on the Trademark Office

December 30, 2010

What has happened in the courts and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) since In re Bose? Surprisingly, not much. As a trademark attorney in Miami with a large trademark docket, fraud on the trademark office is a topical issue I continually follow.
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You are well aware that last year's Bose decision - In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009) - has completely changed the criteria for finding fraud on the Trademark Office. The Bose fraud criteria can be summed up as follows: "in order to prove fraud, [the charging party] must show that [1] a statement was false, [2] the falsity was intentional, and that [3] the false statements were material to obtaining or maintaining a registration. Moreover, fraud must be proven [4] to the hilt with clear and convincing evidence." Slaska Wytwornia Wodek Gatunkowtch "Polmos" SA v. Stawski Distributing Co., Inc., Cancellation No. 92044806 (TTAB 2010).

The Bose holding was so revolutionary, it spawned the following exemplary titles for law review and legal articles: "Bose changes everything," "Is there any reason to still be concerned about fraud?" "Has Bose blown away the trademark fraud cancellation crusade?," "Curtain falls on fraud on the Trademark Office." Legal pundits have opined that Bose may have raised the bar for committing fraud on the Trademark Office to a nearly unattainable level. Indeed, in light of the facts of the Bose case, a reasonable argument can be made that fraud has been virtually eliminated.

In light of the above, it is no surprise that since the Bose decision, there is not one reported District Court or Federal Circuit case regarding fraud on the Trademark Office (as of early Dec. 2010). Further, since Bose, there have been 43 cases involving fraud at the TTAB (as of early Dec. 2010), and of those 43, none have resulted in a finding of fraud. This illustrates how difficult it has become post-Bose to succeed in cancelling a registration based on fraud. As a result, a finding of fraud in any District Court or TTAB case could be negative legal history for Bose, would almost certainly be a reported decision and would surely be written about and scrutinized by the legal journals. But don't hold your breath, I suspect it will be a very long time before we see any forum find fraud after Bose.

Can Filing a Patent Infringement Suit Hurt You in a Re-Exam?

December 29, 2010


I came upon a super interesting Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision issued today. I found the Smucker v. Mack-Ray case interesting for both educational and entertainment reasons. The decision involves the effect an infringement action may have on a re-exam. But the BPAI used uncharacteristically harsh words to reject the Appellant's arguments, which made it amusing. It's rare to see any emotion in a BPAI decision, so when you see Jones Day get a verbal spanking, you can't help but write about it.
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In the Smuckers v. Mack-Ray case, the patent owner had sued the defendant for patent infringement in District Court. Naturally, the patent infringement complaint stated that the defendant's accused device infringed on Mack-Ray's patent. But it so happens that the accused device was described in a prior art reference that predated the filing date of the patent-at-issue. Consequently, in the re-exam proceeding, the defendant Smuckers argued that the patent infringement complaint served as an "admission" by Mack-Ray that its patent was disclosed by prior art - ergo, the patent was anticipated and thus should be invalidated. Novel argument by Jones Day, if you ask me.

The BPAI, however, did not agree. The BPAI stated: "We disagree with the Appellant. We are not directed by the Appellant to any persuasive precedent that mere filing of a lawsuit is an "admission," as asserted. As explained by the Appellant during the Oral Hearing, the Patent Owner instituted the infringement action by filing a simple notice pleading which merely stated that the Patent Owner "owns this patent and Smucker's [Appellant] nozzles infringe." We decline to find such filings to be an admission as characterized by the Appellant.

"While the Patent Owner may have necessarily construed the asserted claims of the '994 patent in concluding that a particular commercialized dispenser infringes, claim construction is a matter of law. The fact that the Patent Owner may have construed the claims one way does not establish what the claims actually mean or that the advocated construction is correct as a matter of law. In this regard, we also disagree with the Appellant's fundamental contention that whatever the implicit claim construction by the Patent Owner is, such construction must be encompassed by the broadest reasonable interpretation used by the PTO. Not only are we not provided with any persuasive authority on point in support of this contention, but the Board's experience in routinely finding unreasonable claim constructions, whether that of appellants or examiners, does not support the Appellant's contention." Ouch!

The moral of the story here is that when it comes to a re-exam, focus on the prior art at hand and how it does or does not anticipate or obviate the patent-at-issue. Don't bring up ancillary or uber-creative arguments that have little or no chance of success and that may evoke a harsh rebuke from the Board. It makes you look bad and that can have an effect on your professional reputation.

But the scolding didn't stop there. Here are a few samples of the Board's stinging language. In response to a Appellant's unreasonable request for a factual finding, the Board states: "It is not the PTO's responsibility, nor does the PTO have the resources, to evaluate such factual matters." In response to the Appellant's argument that the Examiner should elaborate his reasoning: "We do not subscribe to the view that such plain and unambiguous terms need further construction." And most notably, in response to the Appellant's argument that the Patent Owner shouldn't stay silent: "The Appellant also ... points out the Patent Owner's "extraordinary decision to remain silent throughout these proceedings" ... While the Patent Owner's silence is atypical, we observe that it was the Appellant that initiated this inter partes reexamination proceeding and the Patent Owner is on record as to what the ... reference ..., does, and does not disclose. To the contrary, after hundreds of pages of arguments and exhibits as well as an oral hearing, it is the Appellant's silence with respect to where the ... reference discloses the "key limitation" that is deafening." TKO!

How to lose your "ordinary dictionary meaning" argument at the Board of Patent Appeals

December 27, 2010

Today's first Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision involved an eloquent exposition of the relationship between claim construction and ordinary dictionary meaning. The case of Ex parte Benson involved a 35 U.S.C. 102 rejection of a claim that turned on the construction of the claim term "embedded." As a Patent Attorney in Miami with a full docket of patent cases, BPAI decisions that involve claim construction are highly topical for me.
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In Ex parte Benson, the BPAI explored the issue of how the claim term "embedded" should be construed. The Applicant argued the claim term should be given the more narrow ordinary dictionary meaning. And the Examiner, as usual, argued it should be given a broader meaning that supported the 35 U.S.C. 102 anticipation rejection. The Applicant argued the Examiner's claim construction was over-broad and unreasonable.

The BPAI decided: "We recognize that in giving the term "embedded" the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the usage of the term in the Specification; we have expanded the meaning of "embedded" beyond its common dictionary meaning. However, in this instance, it is clear from the disclosure in the Specification that the meaning of "embedded" is not limited to the dictionary definition. See, e.g., In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)."

The lesson here is that when you launch an "unreasonable interpretation" attack on an Examiner's rejection based on an "ordinary dictionary meaning" premise, you must make sure your specification didn't broaden the scope of the claim term at issue. If your specification did, in fact, broaden the scope of the claim term, then you would be wise to use another claim term that explicitly limits its scope to the ordinary dictionary meaning you assert. This is yet another reason why a precisely drafted claim is so important in patent prosecution. I had previously expounded on the issue of precise claim drafting in a blog post here.

Can you get attorneys fees in a Trademark Infringement suit under the Lanham Act?

December 15, 2010

Can you get attorneys fees in a Trademark Infringement suit under the Lanham Act? In short, the answer is yes, but only in exceptional cases. This is an issue that often comes up in lawsuits of all types, especially intellectual property cases. As a Florida Intellectual Property Attorney, damages are a topical subject I'm often asked about.
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As the prevailing party under the Lanham Act, a party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in "exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117. Intentional, deliberate or willful conduct is usually sufficient to make out an "exceptional case." See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. P.K. Sorren Export Co., 546 F.Supp. 987, 999 (S.D.Fla.1982) (attorneys' fees awarded where infringement was deliberate); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F.Supp. 990, 999 (W.D.Mo.1986) (deliberate and intentional infringement makes the case "exceptional").

As an example of an exceptional case, in Nutrivida, Inc. v. Inmuno Vital, Inc., 46 F.Supp.2d 1310 (S.D. Fla., 1998), the Defendant continued to utilize the trademark at issue long after receiving a cease and desist letter. The Court found that under the foregoing authorities, such deliberate, knowing and intentional infringement warranted a determination that the case was "exceptional" for purposes of determining the trademark holder's entitlement to an attorneys' fee award under the Lanham Act.

The lesson here is that your case must be exceptional to get attorney's fee and there must be a showing of deliberate intent to make the case exceptional. This is difficult to prove in cases involving likelihood of confusion where the Defendants did not know beforehand that their mark was similar to the Plaintiff's mark. But in counterfeiting cases, or cases where the Defendant was contacted beforehand and he continued infringing, intent is easier to prove. In those cases, attorney's fees are in play.

How to determine attorney's fees is another matter altogether. The Court normally applies the "lodestar" approach set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) and Norman v. The Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir.1988). To arrive at the lodestar amount, the Court is required to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate for the services of the prevailing party's attorney. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. Once the Court arrives at the lodestar figure, it may be adjusted according to whether the results were excellent, whether the fee was fixed or contingent, and other factors. In intellectual property cases, other courts have held that "a party should be entitled to retain the most competent counsel available" because the issues are difficult and require great skill and experience on the part of the attorneys. Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 761 F.Supp. 1193, 1196, 1199 (E.D.Pa.1990).

Can You Get Punitive Damages for Trademark Infringement?

November 29, 2010

Can you get punitive damages in a Trademark Infringement case? In short, the answer is yes, but only in certain cases and certain jurisdictions. This is an issue that often comes up in trademark infringement cases where compensatory damages are not adequate to compensate the aggrieved party. As a Miami Trademark Lawyer currently litigating trademark infringement cases in the Southern District of Florida, I am constantly dealing with the subject of damages.
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Punitive damages are damages intended to reform or deter the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar to that which spawned the lawsuit. The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff. The plaintiff in a trademark infringement case, however, will in fact receive the punitive damage award. Often, punitive damages are awarded where compensatory damages are deemed an inadequate remedy. The public policy behind punitive damages is that the court may impose them to prevent under-compensation of plaintiffs, to allow redress for undetectable torts.

Punitive damages are available and may be pursued under the Florida common law for trademark infringement. Victoria's Secret v. V. Secrete Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Fla. Statute 495.161. Therefore, in especially egregious cases of trademark infringement, such as cases that involve willful infringement, the Plaintiff should consider requesting punitive damages in addition to the other available remedies, e.g., Defendant's profits, attorney's fees and costs. The Florida statutes, however, should be consulted regarding the potential caps on punitive damages. Fla. Stat. 768.73.


Is the Registrant's Financial Data Relevant to Damages in a Trademark Infringement Case?

November 25, 2010

HAPPY THANKSGIVING!!

How do you calculate damages in a Trademark Infringement case? Is the financial data of the Plaintiff relevant when calculating damages in a trademark infringement case? This is an issue that often comes up during the discovery phase of a trademark infringement case. As a Miami Trademark Attorney currently involved in multiple trademark infringement cases in the Southern District of Florida, the subject of calculating damages is always in the forefront of my mind.
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With regard to a federal trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act, a Plaintiff can elect to recover actual or statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117. Section 1117(a) allows a registrant to recover Defendants' profits, Plaintiff's damages and the costs of the action. Plaintiff's damages, however, may be calculated as Defendant's profits and therefore does not involve an inquiry into Plaintiff's financial situation. Nutrivida, Inc. v. Inmuno Vital, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 1998) ("An award of an infringer's profits has traditionally been viewed under the Lanham Act and the common law of unfair competition as a way of compensating the plaintiff for sales lost to the infringer.") Therefore, a calculation of damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117 does not necessitate an exploration of Plaintiff's financial data in any way.

With regard to Florida common law trademark infringement, Florida common law mirrors the damages available under 15 U.S.C. § 1117. Again, under Florida common law, Plaintiff's damages may be calculated as Defendant's profits and therefore does not involve an inquiry into Plaintiff's financial data. Nutrivida, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.

Consequently, a Plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit (federal or Florida state) may elect damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and Florida common law, wherein Plaintiff's financial information is irrelevant. Therefore, the financial data of the Plaintiff may not be discoverable by the Defendant in a trademark infringement suit and such attempts by the Defendant should be resisted in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is especially concerning in cases where the financial information being sought can be used by the Defendant to gain a competitive edge over the Plaintiff.

Similarity in Advertising and the Trademark Infringement Analysis

November 24, 2010

Does the type of advertising employed by a Defendant in a trademark infringement case matter? Yes it does. In fact, it is one of several key factors that are central to a trademark infringement case. As a Miami Trademark Attorney currently representing litigants in multiple trademark infringement cases in the Southern District of Florida, advertising and its relation to the trademark infringement analysis are subjects that have come up more than once in a dispute.
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It is standard in a trademark infringement case to discover information about advertising employed by the Defendant, since similarity in advertising media is one of the seven factors used in assessing whether likelihood of consumer confusion - the touchstone of trademark infringement - has occurred. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 122 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir.1997).In determining the likelihood of confusion between two marks, the 11th Circuit requires a district court to analyze the following seven factors:
(1) type of mark,
(2) similarity of mark,
(3) similarity of the products the marks represent,
(4) similarity of the parties' retail outlets and customers,
(5) similarity of advertising media used,
(6) defendant's intent and
(7) actual confusion.

As such, the type of advertising (element 5 in the seven factor test above) employed by the infringing party is probative of whether there was similarity between the advertising used by the infringer, as compared to that of the Plaintiff. Frehling Enterprises v. Int'l Group Select, 192 F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir., 1999). Consequently, it is important that all information pertaining to the advertising used by the Defendant in a trademark infringement case is requested and produced during the discovery period of a lawsuit, since similarity in advertising media is crucial to the trademark infringement inquiry