Florida Patent Lawyer Blog

On Monday of this week, Microsoft filed a patent infringement suit against Robocast alleging infringement of the 6,632,248 patent, which covers customization of network documents. Robocast, a New York based company, enables users to see more web pages, more easily and turns the act of browsing into an automated, interactive experience.

The 6,632,248 patent covers the customization of network documents by accessing customization information on a server computer using unique user. User-selected customization information for a network (e.g., HTML) document is stored at a server with reference to user identifying information that uniquely identifies the user. Whenever the user navigates back to the network address of the HTML document, the user is identified automatically and receives a customized HTML document formed in accordance with the customization information. This invention allows HTML sites to customize their site to a user's preferences based on previous visits to a website. Not a bad idea in today's multi-platform world where web site viewing problems are common.

The value of the 6,632,248 patent is proportional to the e-commerce industry. According to research firm IDC, the size of total worldwide e-commerce, when global business-to-business and consumer transactions are added together, will equate to $16 trillion in 2013. IDate, another research firm, estimates the global market for digital products and services at $4.4 trillion in 2013. A report by Oxford Economics adds those two together to estimate the total size of the digital economy at $20.4 trillion, equivalent to roughly 13.8% of global sales.

What is the motivation for this lawsuit? Microsoft, the 800 pound gorilla, is obviously protecting its patent and its share of the worldwide e-commerce industry, which it routinely does by keeping a close eye on firms of any size that may pose a threat to their market share. Robocast, which has a single U.S. Patent No. 7,155,451 and other patents pending, may be validated by this lawsuit as it may indicate Robocast is on to something big enough - customization of internet searches - to attract Microsoft's attention. Thus, this lawsuit could affect Robocast's value both negatively, as well as positively,

In Microsoft's favor is the statistic that most patent cases (75.5%, to be exact) settle. When cases do go to final judgment, and almost 15% do, patentees win 989 out of 3,043, or 32.5%, of those cases. Thus, when you look at the general statistics, there is a good chance that Microsoft can either settle this case, or obtain a final judgment in its favor. Of course, these statistics can also be viewed as weighing in Robocast's favor, since it would be to their benefit, as Defendants, to settle this case and continue operating its business.

Continue reading "Microsoft Sues Robocast for Infringement of Software Patent" »

Today, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) upheld an Examiner's 35 U.S.C. §103 obviousness rejection in light of the KSR v. Teleflex case. This blog post highlights those fundamental elements of an obviousness rejection that the PTAB seeks when upholding an Examiner's decision.

In today's Ex parte Naoki Soejima (Appeal No. 2011-000339) decision, the claims involved a method of manufacturing a cover for a vehicle airbag. At issue was a claim element reciting a teaching line corresponding to a linear groove, wherein the teaching line is formed in an airbag cover supporting surface of an airbag cover supporting jig.

Appellant argued that the prior art did not teach or suggest the claimed invention, in part because the prior art did not disclose that its teaching line is formed in the surface of a supporting jig.

The Board held the Appellant's argument was "unavailing since they fail to consider the prior art as a whole." The Board cited In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references."). The Board further stated:

"For obviousness under § 103, all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success." In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Appellants have not specifically disputed the Examiner's determination that Bauer discloses teaching data by tracing a groove formed in a workpiece (Ans. 7-8; Reply Br. 2); or that Honma discloses "it is known to teach profiling data by tracing the workpiece support (i.e., jig) (column 2, lines 6-55)" as opposed to the workpiece itself (Ans. 4, App. Br. generally; Reply Br. 3). See also Honma, col. 1, ll. 45-57 (describing known use of an auto-teaching method in which a teaching operation is performed using a jig). In this regard, a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's determination that the claimed invention merely applies a known alternative technique of using a supporting jig versus the workpiece for obtaining profiling data to yield predictable results (Ans. 5, 7). See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 ("The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results."). Appellant has not adduced any persuasive technical reasoning or otherwise in response to the Examiner's reasonable determination ..." (Emphasis added)

Lessons Learned: When responding to an Examiner's 35 U.S.C. §103 obviousness rejection, it is not enough to argue that the cited references, individually, do not disclose your claim elements. This is a common tactic among patent practitioners and I, myself, am guilty of this. As explained above, In re Merck stands for the notion that "non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually." Therefore, the best approach would be to both attack the cited references individually and attack the cited references in combination. In the case above, the Appellant would have been smart to include an explanation of why the two references combined would not have yielded the claimed invention. This would have satisfied the PTAB in providing an argument that responded to the Examiner's assertion that the combination of references rendered the claims obvious.

Continue reading "Attacking References Individually: Obviousness Rejection Upheld by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" »

As a patent practitioner, it's not often that anyone, including the Patent Office, says that you have or have not met the evidentiary standard. Tough it is a phrase often read in civil and criminal cases in courts of law, it has not made it into the vernacular at the USPTO. So it may surprise some practitioners to know that there is, actually, an evidentiary standard at the USPTO.

In today's Ex parte Torrens (Appeal No. 2010-007811) decision, the claims involved a computer program for use in editing video. At issue was an Examiner's 35 U.S.C. §103 obviousness rejection, which the Board actually reversed. But what is more interesting is that the Board cited the evidentiary standard that an Examiner's findings of fact must meet.

On that issue, the Board stated:

"the following enumerated findings of fact (FF) are supported at least by a preponderance of the evidence ... See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Patent Office)."

Preponderance of the evidence, also known as balance of probabilities, is the standard required in most civil cases. This is also the standard of proof used in grand jury indictment proceedings.The standard is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true. Effectively, the standard is satisfied if there is greater than 50 percent chance that the proposition is true. This is also the standard of proof used when determining eligibility of unemployment benefits in civil employment cases.

What does this mean for practitioners? The evidentiary standard of a preponderance of the evidence means that in the course of making arguments before the Patent Office, you should aim to prove your point in a manner that is "more likely than not." You don't need a rock-solid argument and evidence during prosecution, but at a bare minimum, you do need an argument and evidence that makes it more likely than not that your argument is correct. So present as much as evidence as you can, and make sure there is more evidence and more arguments in your favor than not.

Continue reading "Pop Quiz: What is the evidentiary standard at the USPTO?" »

In one of the more interesting decisions on this Friday, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) affirmed an Examiner's rejection based on the Appellant forgetting to argue that the Examiner erred. This Quick Post highlights the basics of responding to Examiner rejections.

Recall that "the Patent Office has the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for its rejection. It may not . . . resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in its factual basis." In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). The allocation of burdens requires that the USPTO produce the factual basis for its rejection of an application under 35 U.S.C. § 102. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (CCPA 1967)). See my post last year regarding the factual determinations in 102 rejections.

The case of Ex parte Gutierrez (Appeal No. 2009-009811) involved a viscous industrial fluid used as lubricating oil. In responding to a 102 rejection, the Appellants referred the Board to their previous arguments wherein Appellants argued that the prior art does not anticipate the claimed lubricating oil, and that the prior art does not describe the composition with sufficient detail to determine if it falls within the scope of Appellants' claims. Appellants, however, made no statement about the Examiner's factual determinations in his rejection.

The Board decided:

"Appellants do not argue that the Examiner's findings of fact ... are in error. Nor do Appellants argue that the Examiner's conclusions about the parameters that would have been considered obvious were made in error... Thus, Appellants do not argue that the Examiner erred in concluding the claimed lubricating oil and related methods would have been obvious. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner's decision to reject the claims ..."

What does this mean for practitioners? This means that you should explicitly contest any adverse factual findings of an Examiner, or else those findings will be taken as true by the Board. You should explicitly state that the Examiner erred in making one or more factual findings and then provide evidence of why those factual findings are wrong. If you argue that the prior art doesn't anticipate a claim or that the claim is not obvious, but forget to assert the Examiner erred in his factual findings, then the Examiner's factual findings may be taken as true and you could lose your appeal.

Continue reading "Quick Post: Board Finds Appellant Must Argue That Examiner Erred" »

In its first decision on this Friday the 13th, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI), reversed an Examiner's 103 obviousness rejection based on the Examiner's faulty inherency logic. I like this reversal because it highlights the Examiner's burden and the consequences of not meeting that burden - i.e., a win for the Applicant.

With regard to inherency, recall M.P.E.P. 2112 states that where an Applicant claims a composition in terms of a function, property or characteristic and the composition of the prior art is the same as that of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference, the examiner may make an inherency rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, expressed as a 102 or 103 rejection. See my post last year regarding the use of inherency in 103 obviousness rejections.

The case of Ex parte Smith (Appeal No. 2010-008057) involved an industrial resin. The claims recited a filler that covalently bonds with another element. The Examiner rejected the claims based on 35 U.S.C. 103(a) stating that the cited prior art discloses the same chemical structure and that the claimed covalent bonding aspect was inherent to the chemical structure disclosed in the prior art. Specifically, on the issue of the covalent bonding, the Examiner stated solely the following: "providing a workable amount of covalent bond forming coupling agents would have been obvious ... and coupling agents forms strong covalent bonds." (verbatim). That's all the Examiner had to say on the issue of inherency.

The Applicant responded with attorney argument that the cited prior art is silent on the issue of covalent bonding and that, in fact, the cited prior art could result in other types of bonding, such as ionic bonding, not necessarily covalent bonding.

The Board found:

"an inherent characteristic must be inevitable, and not merely a possibility or probability. See In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981)."

The Examiner simply concluded that Applicant's claimed chemical structure would inherently result in a covalent bond and stated nothing more.

"The Examiner has not established with any evidence or provided any explanation on this record why the use of the ... agents ... in the prior art ... would inevitably, or necessarily, result in a direct covalent bond as claimed."

The Board continued:

"the Examiner has not satisfied the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness."

And thus, the Board reversed the Examiner's rejection.

What does this mean for practitioners? This means that you should closely analyze an Examiner's 103 obviousness rejection based on inherency to determine whether the cited art would inevitably, or necessarily, result in the Applicant's claimed device, composition or method. It is not enough for the Examiner to conclude that the cited art could potentially result in the Applicant's claimed device, composition or method. In order to meet his burden, the Examiner must cite evidence that the cited art would inevitably, or necessarily, result in the Applicant's claimed device, composition or method. If the Examiner does not meet this burden, then you may have grounds for reversal.

Continue reading "Board of Patent Appeals Reverses Examiner's Inherency Finding" »

In a decision today at the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI), the Board reversed an Examiner's 103 obviousness rejection based on the unreasonableness of the Examiner's interpretation of the word "on."

The case of Ex parte Goruganthu (Appeal No. 2010-005235) involved a method of making lenses. The claims involved methods for forming solid immersion lenses on a resist film. One of the central issues was the meaning of the claim term "on." What does the term "on" mean?

The Board began by first contruing the claim term:

We begin by noting that while the term "on" is not expressly defined in the Specification, the broadest reasonable meaning of this term in its ordinary usage is a function word to indicate direct or indirect physical contact. See, e.g., pages 1574 and 1575 of WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW WORLD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (G. & C. Merriam Webster, 1971) (on defined as "used as a function word to indicate contiguity or dependence.").

Based on the dictionary definition of the term "on," the Board followed by construing the Applicant's claim:

Thus, the claim requires forming an array of solid immersion lenses in direct or indirect physical contact with the resist film. This is a reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification as it teaches that its solid immersion lens array 36 may be formed directly on (i.e., in direct physical contact with) the underlying resist film.

Then, the Board went on to define what the Examiner found in the prior art:

"the Examiner maintains that Hugle teaches the disputed claim feature because Hugle' s Figure 4 illustrates a lens array 34 that is spaced above photoresist 35 (corresponding to the claimed resist film feature required by the claims) such that the lens array 34 is on the photoresist"

So the Examiner found a prior art reference that showed a lens array located over, but not touching, a photoresist. Was the Examiner correct in concluding that since the prior art showed A spaced above B, this would obviate a claim reciting A "on" B? The Board did not think so.

"Given the proper construction of the term "on" discussed above, we determine that the Examiner's interpretation of the term "on" to include a position that is spaced above the photoresist 35 is unreasonably broad. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ... nowhere does Hugle teach that the lens array is formed 'on the resist film' as required by the claims.

The Examiner simply directs us to no credible evidence to support the position that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood Appellants' disclosure to support this broader interpretation."

In short, the Board found that a prior art reference showing a lens array space above, but not touching, a photoresist, was not the same as, and does not obviate, a claim reciting a lens array "on" a photoresist. Consequently, the Examiner's rejection was reversed.

What does this mean for patent practitioners? It means that when dealing with claims terms that comprise everyday language, you should challenge claim rejections that interpret that language too broadly. The BPAI is required to analyze claims in their broadest reasonable interpretation. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In cases involving everyday language that is not defined in the specification, the dictionary definition is used to construe that claim language. So get your dictionary out and make sure the Examiner didn't go beyond the dictionary definition. If he did, you may have grounds for a reversal, as in the Ex parte Goruganthu case.

Continue reading "Board of Patent Appeals Decides Broadest Reasonable Interpretation of Term "On"" »

The unfortunate death of Michael Jackson and the trial of Dr. Conrad Murray has made a little-known drug, propofol (marketed as Diprivan by AstraZeneca), into a household name. What is fundamentally important about drugs like propofol may not only be what they're used for but their impact on the economy.

Propofol was originally developed in the UK by Imperial Chemical Industries (see U.S. Patent No. 4056635). Though clinical trials followed in 1977, due to negative reactions, the formulation was withdrawn from the market and subsequently reformulated as an emulsion of a soya oil/propofol mixture in water. The emulsified formulation, which is not a complex formula, was relaunched in 1986 by ICI (now AstraZeneca) under the brand name Diprivan. Propofol emulsion is a highly opaque, white fluid due to the scattering of light from the tiny oil droplets that it contains. There are 4 patents (5714520, 5731355, 5731356, 5908869) for Diprivan that are set are to expire in 2015.

The relatively simple formula for Diprivan, which generates annual sales of $400 - $500 Million for AstraZeneca, may make it easy for generics to enter the propofol market. True generics are not expected until 2015, but generics with different formulas are expected to come to market before 2015. It has been reported that propofol is a low profit-margin product. Thus, once generic-like products and generics hit the market, the margins will likely fall further. This brings up fundamental questions about the patent system. Should patent protection be extended in order to protect a patent owner's investment in a drug? Inventors and investors must justify the return on investment (ROI) on millions and billions of dollars spent on developing new drug products, otherwise, they simply won't do it anymore. Is 20 years enough time to obtain an adequate return on those large R&D expenditures? For instance why has Pfizer drastically cut its research and development spending and why has Amgen decided to buy back $5 billion of its stock? Are those indications that they don't have the incentive to invest in new products?

Creating an incentive to invent, via recovery of R&D expenditure and production of profits, is the premise of the U.S. patent system. We would be wise to review the current system to make sure this is still the case.

Continue reading "Propofol and the Economy" »

In an interesting decision today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decided that dosages are, for the most part, obvious. The case of Ex parte Gillis (Appeal 2010-009318) involved method claims for administering a medical therapy. Fundamental to the claims was a recitation of the dosage necessary to appropriately treat the patient. Assuming the medicine itself is prior art, does specific dosage data give your invention enough novelty?

The BPAI provided the following recitation of case law:

It is well settled that "the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is usually obvious." Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The rationale for determining the optimal parameters for prior art result effective variables "flows from the 'normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known.'" Id. (quoting In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).

In general, however, "an applicant may overcome a prima facie case of obviousness by establishing 'that the [claimed] range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range.'" In re Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330 (quoting In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-70 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

That spells it out pretty clearly - discovery of a dosage value for a known medicine is obvious, unless you can show unexpected results. Consequently, the BPAI provided the following decision in the Ex parte Gillis case:

[G]iven the broad range of useful dosages described in Wappler, we are not persuaded that the Examiner has failed to provide an adequate evidentiary basis for concluding that an ordinary artisan practicing Wagemans' continuous delivery method would have optimized the sufentanil dosage. As Appellants point us to no evidence that the dosage recited in claim 28 provides an unexpected result, and is therefore critical, see Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330, we are not persuaded that the claimed dosage would have been unobvious over the cited references, despite the fact that the two cited references do not appear to describe the same route of drug administration.

Therefore, the Examiner's rejection was affirmed. As an aside, note that even though the prior art disclosed a different drug delivery method, this was not enough to distinguish the claims from the prior art.

What does this mean for patent practitioners? It means that when prosecuting drug therapy patent applications, you should rely on more than dosage data to distinguish the invention over the prior art, unless you can show unexpected results. Without the proper evidence supporting unexpected results, dosage data does not, by itself, provide enough novelty to an otherwise known medicine or therapy.

Continue reading "Board of Patent Appeals Decides on Obviousness of Dosages" »

Companies like Eastman Kodak sell products that are protected by valuable patents. The importance of the patents used to protect these products is highlighted by Kodak's recent financial troubles. Kodak, with a current market cap of about $295 million, might only be able to save itself by selling a portfolio of 1,100 digital imaging patents for an estimated $2-$3 Billion.

Kodak obtained one of its first patents (No. 1588082) in 1926. The invention was aimed at creating a photographic process that could fit into a portable, small box. Kodak went on to become one of the biggest patent filers in history. Consequently, Kodak's name became synonymous with photography for the better part of a century. But since the late 1900s, Kodak's dominance in the film business has been replaced by new technology. Due to the change in photographic technology and heavy competition, the Kodak name seems to have lost its prestige. But although the name may have less value these days, the patent royalties it generates, and the ultimate value of the company, is still high. Notably, Kodak may be collecting $1 billion in royalties soon.

The takeaway from the Eastman Kodak story is that it's important for technology companies to patent their inventions and protect their patents. Eastman Kodak's patents may be their only saving grace at this juncture.

Continue reading "Patents are the Heart of Many Companies - Eastman Kodak Case Study" »

Yesterday's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision in Ex Parte Knox confirms what I've always thought about a "no motivation to combine" argument after the decision of KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc, - it's a narrow argument that doesn't have much punch.

The case of Ex parte Knox involved a computer program invention. The Examiner rejected the claims for being obvious in light of two prior art references - Lai and Bradshaw - under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellants presented a standard "no motivation to combine" argument.

The Board rejected this argument, first reciting case law that is often recited in BPAI decisions:

[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill." KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). The test of non-obviousness is not whether one reference can be bodily inserted into another, but, rather, what the references, when considered together, would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art, In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981), who is a person of ordinary creativity and not an automaton, KSR, 550 U.S. at 421, and whose inferences and creative steps we may consider, id. at 418.

If you ask me, this is pretty strong language that negates just about any "no motivation to combine" argument. The In re Keller holding appears to eliminate the need to show that two references can even be combined in a technical sense.

In light of the case law cited, the Board concluded the following:

We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Bradshaw's technique of comparing first checksums with second checksums would improve Lai's file version recording ... We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art, using no more than ordinary skill and creativity, would have recognized that the calculation of a checksum ... could be performed using a checksum algorithm that is insensitive to the ordering of data, such as that taught by Lai

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The lesson learned from this case is that "no motivation to combine" arguments are not among the strongest arguments you can make at the BPAI. Seeing as the case law on combining prior art references is heavily weighted on the side of combining, I would leave this argument at the bottom of your toolbox along with the "non-analogous art" argument. Of course, every practitioner runs into tough situations at some point, and if you have nothing else, digging to the bottom of your toolbox is sometimes necessary.

Continue reading "Board of Patent Appeals Rejects "No Motivation to Combine" Argument Once More" »

Much has been written about the Pfizer Viagra patent. Recently, a District Court held the patent to be valid. All the fighting about this patent is directly related to Pfizer's $1 billion a year in U.S. Viagra sales. The patent itself has been valuated somewhere in the neighborhood of $10 billion.

But have you taken a look at the famous Pfizer Viagra patent? I did, and following are some interesting observations. Click here to see Pfizer's Viagra patent.

First, I am surprised to see how short the detailed description is. At less than six columns, it's one of the shorter patents out there. This goes to show, being brief is a virtue - even when you're dealing with a $10 billion patent. Second, notice how many pages of cited references there are. At 6 pages, that's a lot of references, and no doubt led to a stronger and more valuable patent. Lastly, note there are only two inventors. Though the testing and development of this drug probably cost somewhere in the billions of dollars and involved hundreds or thousands of people, it was only two guys that invented this drug and only two guys that will go down in history.

As inventors and developers of technology, we can only hope to have successful inventions. But it is certain that in order to realize a return on R&D investment, individuals and companies must pursue patents for their inventions. Thus, my recommendation to inventors and technology companies is to seriously consider pursuing patents for their inventions with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, especially in cases involving inventions that may generate significant revenue.

Continue reading "The Famous Pfizer Viagra Patent" »

Yesterday's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision in Ex Parte Lin reveals a common patent prosecution error -especially before the BPAI - failing to properly address a rejection.

The case of Ex Parte Lin involved a photolithography invention. The Examiner rejected the claims under the 1st paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 for failing to comply with the enablement requirement. According to the Examiner, the Specification disclosure would not enable a person with ordinary skill in this art (POSITA) to make or use, without undue experimentation, a "photomask with wavelength-reducing material throughout the full scope of the claimed refractive index range."

Appellants argued that an artisan could make or use the photomasks because a paragraph of their specification disclosed specific wavelength-reducing materials which are known in the art to have a refractive index larger than 1.

The Board rejected this argumment, stating:

The deficiency of this argument is that it fails to address with any reasonable specificity the issue raised by the Examiner's rejection. Contrary to Appellants' belief, the issue under consideration is not whether specific wavelength-reducing materials disclosed in the Specification have a refractive index larger than 1. ... Rather, the issue before us is whether the Specification would enable an artisan to make and use, without undue experimentation, a photomask with wavelength-reducing materials throughout the claimed refractive index ... See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (the specification must teach those of skill in the art how to make and how to use the invention as broadly as it is claimed). Appellants' argument does not address this issue and therefore does not reveal any reversible error in the § 112, 1st paragraph, rejection.

The lesson here is that you must address an Examiner's rejection head-on. Don't respond to a rejection with a tangential or side-issue. And specifically, when dealing with a § 112, 1st paragraph, rejection, the issue you must confront head-on is the issue of whether the specification teaches POSITA how to make and how to use the invention. Addressing anything else will only serve to draw attention away from the central issue.

Continue reading "Common Patent Prosecution Mishap: Failing to Address a 35 U.S.C. 112 Rejection" »

Today's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision in Ex Parte Michelle illustrates just how useless the non-analogous art argument really is.

Not to beat a dead horse, since much has been written about the uselessness of this argument by my fellow patent prosecution bloggers (see Karen H.'s blog posting about this subject here), but seriously, don't use this argument anymore. I have yet to see it succeed even once.

The Ex Parte Michelle case involved a telecommunications network claim rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) for being obvious. The Appellant tried his hand at the "non-analogous art" defense. The Board summarily dismissed this argument in one sentence:

"Further, we find that the references Xu, Huitema and Sollee are in the same field of endeavor, involving middleboxes across multiple address realms on a network. They are thus properly combinable."

That's all the Board wrote. They didn't even offer to explain.

The law on non-analogous art is rather straightforward. References within the statutory terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103 qualify as prior art for an obviousness determination only when analogous to the claimed invention. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA 1979) and In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

The moral of the story here is that the non-analogous art argument is pretty much dead and should be removed from every patent practitioner's toolbox.

Continue reading "Stay Away From the Non-Analogous Art Argument" »

Yesterday's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision in Ex Parte Peng highlighted the most effective way of reversing a Patent Examiner's 103 obviousness type rejection - contesting the presence of one of the claim elements in the cited prior art. I, a Patent Lawyer practicing in the City of Miami, am always interested in reading about how other attorneys have gotten rejections reversed at the BPAI.

The Ex Parte Peng case involved a method claim performed by a GPS receiver. The claim element at issue involved the storage of certain data in sample RAM, followed by a reallocation of purpose of certain memory spaces. The Examiner issued an obviousness type rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a), asserting that the claim element at issue as found in the cited prior art. The Appellant appealed and argued that the claim element was in fact NOT disclosed by the cited prior art.

In a short, one and a half page analysis section, the Board agreed with the Appellant and reversed the rejection. Namely, the Board stated:

"We agree with Appellants that the results of the accumulators are stored in the RAM latch, and not the sample RAM, ... we do not find any teaching or suggestion in the cited reference of a re-allocation for purposes ... there is no indication that some of these time slots ... have been re-allocated in a second mode ... To somehow conclude that the cited re-allocation of the time slots could be accomplished in the RAM latch disclosed in Baranyai would require us to stretch the reference beyond reasonable limits."

It seems like a simple argument - "the prior art does not disclose the claim element" - and it lacks the complexity and depth of standard non-obviousness arguments such as "no articulated reasoning" and "no motivation to combine." But it so happens that this simple argument is the single most successful way to reverse a 35 U.S.C. 103(a) rejection (in electrical cases) on appeal before the BPAI. According to data provided by Michael Messinger, Esq. at the 2010 Board of Patent Appeals conference, 57% of the obviousness reversals in electrical cases were reversed using this argument. The next most successful argument was the "rationale/underpinning", which accounted for 37% of the obviousness reversals in electrical cases.

The lesson here is that if you want to increase your chances of reversing a 35 U.S.C. 103(a) rejection (in electrical cases) on appeal before the BPAI, you would be wise to use "the prior art does not disclose the claim element" argument. This argument is favored by the BPAI, according to the statistics.

Yesterday's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision in Ex Parte Zurcher highlighted the problems associated with using functional language in claims, especially when claiming an apparatus. I, a Patent Lawyer in Miami, have written about this before in my article about intended use claim language.

The Ex Parte Zurcher case involved an electrical-type socket invention. The claim element at issue included functional language. The Examiner asserted a prior art reference that included structure that performed the same function as described in Appellant's functional language. I.e., the Examiner found the claimed functional language inherent in the prior art reference. The ensuing arguments can be separated in three types:

Argument #1

First, the Appellant argued that the structure of the prior art was not the same as the structure disclosed by Appellant in the specification. Nice try, but even a 1st year knows that's a losing argument. You should only be arguing about what's in the claims, not the specification. The Board disagreed with the Appellant and found:

"The fact that the structure of the prior art is structurally different from the structure of the 'disclosed embodiment' Appellant described in the Specification and depicts in the Figures is of little moment. The name of the game is the claim. In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed.Cir.1998)."

Argument #2

Second, the Appellant argued that one of ordinary skill in the art must recognize that the prior art's structure would be capable of performing the functional language of Appellant's claim. The Board disagreed once more and stated:

"There is no such requirement. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Continental Can does not stand for the proposition that an inherent feature of a prior art reference must be perceived as such by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the critical date."); In re Imeprazole Patent Litig., v. Andrx Pharms, Inc., 483 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (recognition in the prior art is not necessary when the claimed characteristic or function is inherently present in the prior art)."

Argument #3

Lastly, the Board identified the central issue as one of simply determining whether the prior art structure performed the same function as the functional claim language. Period. The Board decided :

"[a] patent applicant is free to recite features of an apparatus either structurally or functionally." In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997). "Yet, choosing to define an element functionally, i.e., but what it does, carries with it a risk." Id. "Where the Patent Office has reason to believe that a functional limitation asserted to be critical for establishing novelty in the claimed subject matter may, in fact, be an inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority to require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on. Id., (quoting In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213 (CCPA 1971) and further citing In re Hallman, 655 F.2d 212, 215 (CCPA 1981); In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 663-64 (CCPA 1971).)"

The Lesson

If you use functional language in your claim, the Examiner must only find structure in a prior art reference that performs the same function. The Examiner is NOT required to find the same structure you disclose in your specification and the Examiner is NOT required to prove that a POSITA would know the prior art structure can perform the function at issue. Additionally, the Examiner does NOT have to show that the intended use of the prior art structure is the same as that of the Appellant. Again, the Examiner must only show the prior art structure can perform the functional claim language.

In conclusion, beware of functional claim language, especially when claiming an apparatus. It is more desirable to use structural claim language, which would require an Examiner to find the same structure in the prior art - often a more difficult task.