Florida Patent Lawyer Blog

Today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) reversed an Examiner's obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103, but issued a new grounds of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This Quick Post highlights the need to continue "prosecuting" your patent application, even after you've gone to Appeal.

Recall that 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) states:

"Should the Board have knowledge of any grounds not involved in the appeal for rejecting any pending claim, it may include in its opinion a statement to that effect with its reasons for so holding, which statement constitutes a new ground of rejection of the claim. A new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review."

Thus, even if you've never received a particular rejection by a Patent Examiner during prosecution, the Board of Patent Appeals can, sua sponte, issue that rejection on appeal.

In today's Ex parte Nickell (Appeal No. 2010-008158) decision, the claims involved a computer password protection related invention. At issue was an Examiner's 35 U.S.C. §103 obviousness rejection, which the Board actually reversed. But, the Board went beyond that rejection, without any urging request by any party, and evaluated the claims at issue for compliance with 35 U.S.C. §101.

On that issue, the Board decided:

"Claim 1 does not recite any computer or other machine. For example, the claim does not recite that the steps of randomly selecting and providing the requirements must be performed by a computer, that the steps of receiving characters for the password must be performed by a computer, or that the step of determining whether the characters satisfy any requirements must be performed by a computer. As such, claim 1 is broad enough to read on two human beings communicating verbally, with the first person performing all of the recited steps. ... We, therefore, conclude that claim 1 is not tied to a particular machine or apparatus, and claim 1 does not transform a particular article to a different state or thing. That is, claim 1 fails the so-called 'machine-or transformation test.' The claim, instead, wholly embraces the judicially recognized exception of abstract ideas. Specifically, the claim is directed to a set of mental processes and communications that can be performed solely by a human being."

And thus, the BPAI issued a 35 U.S.C. §101 that was first seen by the Applicant on Appeal. See my earlier post about 35 U.S.C. §101 rejections.

What does this mean for practitioners? This decision means that before going to appeal, you should make sure your claims constitute patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101. It doesn't matter that a Patent Examiner has not issued this type of rejection or that no one ever brought it up during prosecution. The Board can bring up these issues on Appeal, which would then require you to re-open prosecution to clear the rejection - a major prosecution setback. Thus, it's best to take care of these 35 U.S.C. §101 issues earlier than later.

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In an homage to John Welch's well-known TTAB Blog, today we ask "Would you have appealed this 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection?

In a straightforward decision today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) affirmed an Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of a computer program product claim based on the disclosure of a transitory medium in the specification. This blog post highlights a very common rejection for software-related claims.

Recall that "A transitory, propagating signal . . . is not a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter [under 35 U.S.C. § 101] and, therefore, does not constitute patentable subject matter under § 101. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Claims that are so broad that they read on nonstatutory as well as statutory subject matter are unpatentable. Cf. In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1015 (CCPA 1972) (citation omitted) ('Claims which are broad enough to read on obvious subject matter are unpatentable even though they also read on nonobvious subject matter.'). See my previous post regarding 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejections.

The case of Ex parte Castaneda (Appeal No. 2009-013594) involved a software application that provided calendaring services. The Examiner rejected a "computer useable medium" claim because it encompassed carrier waves. Thus, the Examiner found that the claim was directed to non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (In re Lintner notwithstanding).

The Appellant's specification clearly disclosed that a computer usable medium may include propagation mediums, such as electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, or infrared signals. Still, the Appellant decided to appeal and simply argued that the computer usable medium "could" encompass statutory subject matter and that sufficed in overcoming a non-statutory subject matter .

In light of Appellant's disclosure in the specification, the Board decided:

"... we find that the claimed "...computer useable medium embodying computer usable program code..." can be broadly, but reasonably construed to encompass a transitory, propagating signal, which is non-statutory subject matter. Further, since the claim is not limited to a non-transitory, tangible medium within one of the four statutory classes of 35 U.S.C. § 101, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim 13 is directed to nonstatutory subject matter."

I would not have appealed this 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection. Mainly because it would have been so easy to amend the specification or the claim to eliminate non-statutory subject matter. It would have taken no time to delete the non-statutory language from the specification or insert the phrase "wherein computer usable medium does not include transitory subject matter" in an amendment. This often happens when the patent attorney misses the time frame for amending the claim before the Notice of Appeal or Appeal Brief was due and then is stuck having to assert a bogus argument against the 101 rejection. If the due date for filing an Appeal Brief has arrived, it's too late to enter a substantial amendment.

What does this mean for practitioners? This means that if you define your claim term, such as "computer usable medium," to include transitory media, such as carrier signals, then you can expect a 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection. It doesn't matter that your claim term "could possibly" include statutory subject matter. If the claim term's ascribed meaning includes non-statutory subject matter, then a 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection will survive appeal.

Further, watch your docketing due dates and make sure that if you have to amend the specification or claims to avoid a 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection, it is done as soon as possible. Specifically, the amendment should be completed within a month of the Final Rejection, so it will most likely be entered. Don't wait until the date the Appeal Brief or Notice of Appeal is due. Otherwise, you could find yourself in the same predicament as Ex parte Castaneda, which resulted in a full affirmation of the Examiner's rejections - a total loss.

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In short, the answer is "by a preponderance of the evidence." The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision of Ex parte Hochsmann did a good job of highlighting this axiom. As a Miami Patent Lawyer, I found the Ex parte Hochsmann decision interesting because it reminded me of the burden I must carry when I practice before the BPAI.

What does this mean to practitioners? This means that in order to reverse an Examiner's decision at the BPAI, you must present slightly more evidence than the Examiner. Technically, that should suffice. Of course, in practice, you probably want to show a bit more, to make it clear you have met your burden

The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision of Ex parte Yufa affirmed a Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. 112, 1st paragraph, rejection. This was an interesting case for me, a Miami Patent Attorney, because it illustrated a type of rejection I don't deal with much.

In an interesting and somewhat comical opinion today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) rejected an Appellant's argument that a 35 U.S.C. §101 rejection violated the Appellant's rights under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As a Florida Patent Attorney with an active patent prosecution docket, this is the first time I've ever seen the 14th Amendment brought up before the BPAI. See the decision in Ex Parte Haines HERE.

The Appellant, Hewlett Packard, was appealing a 35 U.S.C. §101 non-statutory subject matter rejection of a claim that recited propagated signals. HP argued the USPTO has issued patents to others that contain "propagated signal claims" and therefore the current rejection violated HP's rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The BPAI responded: "Appellant has not cited any authority in support of the novel legal argument. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is not part of a state (or local) government, but an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Cf. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). We are not persuaded that the USPTO has violated Appellant's rights to equal protection of the laws under the Constitution." The footnote reads "absent showing that the agency acted pursuant to some impermissible or arbitrary standard, an argument based on the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would also fail. See In re Boulevard Entertainment, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Frankly, I'm surprised the HP attorney would even advance the 14th Amendment argument. I am careful to avoid flimsy or meritless arguments when practicing before the BPAI, as any document with your name on it affects your professional reputation. I aim to have a reputation as an advocate that only presents solid arguments. Readers will take you more seriously and are more willing to consider your line of reasoning when you have an established history of sound argument-making.

What an illuminating decision! Today's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) decision in Ex parte Harrison read like a veritable anatomy of a 35 U.S.C. § 101 non statutory subject matter rejection under In re Bilski. The highly educational decision in In re Harrison touches on many important issues surrounding § 101 non statutory subject matter rejection. It's not often that the BPAI issues a decision about a § 101 non statutory subject matter rejection, so two in one week is a real treat (see my posting from two days ago) for a practicing Florida patent attorney.

As an aside, I liked the BPAI's mention that "the [Bilski] court declined to decide under the machine implementation branch of the inquiry whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular machine." This confirms that it's still undecided whether reciting a computer or a computer readable medium satisfies the first prong of the machine-or-transformation test.

In one of its last decisions of today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) reversed a Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. §101 non-statutory subject matter rejection of a key Invatron Systems invention. As a Miami Patent Attorney, this case was interesting because I haven't seen any BPAI decisions regarding 35 U.S.C. §101, much less a decision that invokes Bilski, in a while.

At issue was an Invatron Systems claim pertaining to a scale for weighing items, wherein the scale included a computer that performed a series of steps, such as providing a coupon. The Examiner found the claims recite a method of purely mental steps, not tied to another statutory class. The Appellants contended the claimed method recites steps including providing a coupon to the customer and that these steps cannot be performed purely mentally since there is no way to provide a coupon without the coupon being physically inputted into the weigh station display.

The court explained the Bilski machine-or-transformation test as follows: "A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing." The court explained that "the use of a specific machine or transformation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope to impart patent-eligibility" and "the involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process must not merely be insignificant extra-solution activity." In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 17 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), petition for cert. granted, 77 USLW 3442 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2009) (No. 08-964).

The BPAI agreed with the Appellants. See the BPAI decision here. The BPAI stated claim 17 recited a method for providing information to a weigh station, where customer specific information is provided to the weigh station display. That is, claim 17 recited a manner of entering data to a weigh station and displaying the inputted information. As such, claim 17 required a specific structure that captures, stores, and displays specific data. This specific structure ties the recited method to a particular machine, in that the method recites how to operate a weigh station with a weigh station display. Since there is a particular machine required, claim 17 satisfies the machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test and the transformation prong need not be evaluated. As a result, the BPAI reversed the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. §101 non-statutory subject matter rejection under Bilski.

The lesson learned in this case is that although a claim may not explicitly and positively recite a structural element, the claim may require a specific structure to perform the steps of the claim. If that structure satisfies the machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test, an Examiner's 35 U.S.C. §101 non-statutory subject matter rejection may be reversed under Bilski.

In its first decision of today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) reversed a Patent Examiner's 35 U.S.C. sec. 103(a) obviousness rejection of a key Hewlett-Packard software invention, but came up with a new rejection of its own - a 35 U.S.C. sec. 101 non-statutory subject matter rejection. As a Miami Patent Attorney that deals with Patent Office rejections related to software patents and software inventions almost daily, this case is instructive because it illustrates the case law on non-statutory subject matter and the process of dealing with the BPAI.

The HP invention involved a software process for credentialed authorization requests. HP appealed an Examiner's 35 U.S.C. sec. 103(a) obviousness rejection, which the BPAI reversed. But in an interesting move, the BPAI decision sua sponte noted the nature of the software claims and instituted a 35 U.S.C. sec. 101 non-statutory subject matter rejection.The BPAI started off by reciting case law: a "signal" cannot be patentable subject matter because it is not within any of the four categories. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) and a claim that recites no more than software, logic or a data structure (i.e., an abstraction) does not fall within any statutory category. In re Warmerdan, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

With regard to the Applicant's claims, the BPAI stated: "The services of the claims on appeal are logical constructs or software abstractions. System claims, independent claims 21 and 26, are directed to software-based systems per se. Additionally, the computer readable mediums recited in the preamble of independent claims 12 and 14 on appeal are directed toward signal-based embodiments when construed in light of the Specification as filed. The earlier-noted case law prohibits patent protection for these claimed features." Therefore, because the Applicant's claims recited pure logical steps with no explicit tie to a machine, and because the specification stated that a computer readable medium could be a signal, the Applicant's claims were non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. sec. 101. (It is interesting that the BPAI did not cite the Bilski case. Perhaps because the decision may be overturned by the Supreme Court this year?)

The first important practice pointer illustrated here is the importance of writing software patent claims that comprise statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. sec. 101. Fellow blogger Karen Hazzah writes an excellent patent prosecution blog that recently highlighted a USPTO memo directed towards helping patent practitioners write computer readable medium claims that survive 35 U.S.C. sec. 101 scrutiny. All patent attorneys that write software patent claims should read that memo.

The second practice pointer illustrated here is the ability of the BPAI to sua sponte come up with new grounds of rejection. It is not true that just because the Examiner missed a rejection, it can no longer be asserted against you (as in federal litigation). The BPAI has the power to bring up any rejection that the Examiner may have missed, even if it is the first time it's being used against you. The BPAI has always had this power, but in the last couple of years, I typically only see them do this for 35 U.S.C. sec. 101 non-statutory subject matter rejection. Thus, when dealing with an appeal to the BPAI, especially one involving software patent claims, the smart patent attorney will double check his claims to make sure there is no chance of such a sua sponte rejection. If the possibility exists, you may want to file an RCE to clean up the claims before going to appeal.

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