Trademark Cancellation: December 2010 Archives

Update on the Aftermath of In re Bose and Fraud on the Trademark Office

December 30, 2010

What has happened in the courts and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) since In re Bose? Surprisingly, not much. As a trademark attorney in Miami with a large trademark docket, fraud on the trademark office is a topical issue I continually follow.
supreme court.jpg
You are well aware that last year's Bose decision - In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009) - has completely changed the criteria for finding fraud on the Trademark Office. The Bose fraud criteria can be summed up as follows: "in order to prove fraud, [the charging party] must show that [1] a statement was false, [2] the falsity was intentional, and that [3] the false statements were material to obtaining or maintaining a registration. Moreover, fraud must be proven [4] to the hilt with clear and convincing evidence." Slaska Wytwornia Wodek Gatunkowtch "Polmos" SA v. Stawski Distributing Co., Inc., Cancellation No. 92044806 (TTAB 2010).

The Bose holding was so revolutionary, it spawned the following exemplary titles for law review and legal articles: "Bose changes everything," "Is there any reason to still be concerned about fraud?" "Has Bose blown away the trademark fraud cancellation crusade?," "Curtain falls on fraud on the Trademark Office." Legal pundits have opined that Bose may have raised the bar for committing fraud on the Trademark Office to a nearly unattainable level. Indeed, in light of the facts of the Bose case, a reasonable argument can be made that fraud has been virtually eliminated.

In light of the above, it is no surprise that since the Bose decision, there is not one reported District Court or Federal Circuit case regarding fraud on the Trademark Office (as of early Dec. 2010). Further, since Bose, there have been 43 cases involving fraud at the TTAB (as of early Dec. 2010), and of those 43, none have resulted in a finding of fraud. This illustrates how difficult it has become post-Bose to succeed in cancelling a registration based on fraud. As a result, a finding of fraud in any District Court or TTAB case could be negative legal history for Bose, would almost certainly be a reported decision and would surely be written about and scrutinized by the legal journals. But don't hold your breath, I suspect it will be a very long time before we see any forum find fraud after Bose.

Can you get attorneys fees in a Trademark Infringement suit under the Lanham Act?

December 15, 2010

Can you get attorneys fees in a Trademark Infringement suit under the Lanham Act? In short, the answer is yes, but only in exceptional cases. This is an issue that often comes up in lawsuits of all types, especially intellectual property cases. As a Florida Intellectual Property Attorney, damages are a topical subject I'm often asked about.
lawbooks.jpg
As the prevailing party under the Lanham Act, a party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in "exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. ยง 1117. Intentional, deliberate or willful conduct is usually sufficient to make out an "exceptional case." See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. P.K. Sorren Export Co., 546 F.Supp. 987, 999 (S.D.Fla.1982) (attorneys' fees awarded where infringement was deliberate); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F.Supp. 990, 999 (W.D.Mo.1986) (deliberate and intentional infringement makes the case "exceptional").

As an example of an exceptional case, in Nutrivida, Inc. v. Inmuno Vital, Inc., 46 F.Supp.2d 1310 (S.D. Fla., 1998), the Defendant continued to utilize the trademark at issue long after receiving a cease and desist letter. The Court found that under the foregoing authorities, such deliberate, knowing and intentional infringement warranted a determination that the case was "exceptional" for purposes of determining the trademark holder's entitlement to an attorneys' fee award under the Lanham Act.

The lesson here is that your case must be exceptional to get attorney's fee and there must be a showing of deliberate intent to make the case exceptional. This is difficult to prove in cases involving likelihood of confusion where the Defendants did not know beforehand that their mark was similar to the Plaintiff's mark. But in counterfeiting cases, or cases where the Defendant was contacted beforehand and he continued infringing, intent is easier to prove. In those cases, attorney's fees are in play.

How to determine attorney's fees is another matter altogether. The Court normally applies the "lodestar" approach set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) and Norman v. The Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir.1988). To arrive at the lodestar amount, the Court is required to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate for the services of the prevailing party's attorney. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. Once the Court arrives at the lodestar figure, it may be adjusted according to whether the results were excellent, whether the fee was fixed or contingent, and other factors. In intellectual property cases, other courts have held that "a party should be entitled to retain the most competent counsel available" because the issues are difficult and require great skill and experience on the part of the attorneys. Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 761 F.Supp. 1193, 1196, 1199 (E.D.Pa.1990).